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Abstract 
RELA Y is a model of faults and failures that defines failure conditions, which describe test 
data for which execution will guarantee that a fault originales erroneous behavior that also 
transfers through computations and information fiow until a failure is revealed. This model 
of fault detection provides a framework within which other testing criteria's capabilities can 
be evaluated. In this paper, we analyze three test data selection criteria that attempt to 
detect faults in six fault classes. This analysis shows that none of these criteria is capable of 
guaranteeing detection for these fault classes and points out two major weaknesses of these 
criteria. The first weakness is that the criteria do not consider the potential unsatisfiability 
of their rules; each criterion includes rules that are sufficient to cause potential failures for 
some fault classes, yet when such rules are unsatisfiable, many faults may remain undetected. 
Their second weakness is failure to integrate their proposed rules; although a criterion may 
cause a subexpression to take 011 an erroneous value, there is no effort made to guarantee 
that the intermediate values cause observable, erroneous behavior. This paper shows how the 
RELA Y model overcomes these weaknesses. 

1 Introduction 
Testing is intended to reveal failures or to provide confidence tha.t failures do not occur, 
where a fa.Hure is the observa.ble result of erroneous program beha.vior. This is typica.lly 
done by selecting test da.ta, executing the program on tha.t data, a.nd comparing the results 
to some test ora.ele, which determines whether the results are correct or erroneous. Ma.ny 
te~. :tg criteria. [Bud81, DGK+ss, Fos80, Ha.m77, How86, Mor88, Wey81, Zei83] select test 
da.ta focused on detecting failures ca.used by particular fault types, where a fault is a synta.ctic 
defect in the source code. This "fault-ba.sed testing" a.pproa.ch is capa.ble of detecting ma.ny 
of the subtle errors of commission that are revea.led only for very specific data, although it 
can not, except by chance, detect errors of omission 1 . 
In the context of certain assumptions, fault-based testing can guarantee tha.t particular 
faults a.re detected or do not exist. This pa.per reports on a study tha.t a.nalyzes several fault-
based testing criteria in terms of their a.bilities to actually reveal failures for particular fault 
types. This a.na.lysis is based on the RELAY model of faults, failures, a.nd fault detection. The 
RELA Y model defines how a fault origina tes a potential failure in a.n eva.luated expression 
containing the fault a.nd how that potential failure must transfer through computa.tions to 
produce a state failure a.nd through informa.tion fl.ow until it is revea.led as a.n external ( or 
observa.ble) failure. The model provides a mecha.nism for developing failure conditions tha.t 
gua.ra.ntee fa.ult detection. We use these conditions to a.na.lyze the fa.ult detection ca.pa.bilities 
of three fault-based testing criteria.; in particular, this pa.per examines the a.bility of these 
criteria. to reveal sta.te failures a.t the statement containing a fa.ult. 
Through this a.nalysis, we demonstra.te two ma.jor failings of these criteria.. First, in most 
ca.ses, the "fault-specific rules" that comprise these criteria are merely sufficient (i.e., not 
necessa.ry a.nd sufficient) to introduce a potential fa.Hure. When such a fault-specific rule is 
unsa.tisfia.ble, a corresponding fault will not necessarily cause erroneous execution a.nd thus 
ma.y rema.in undetected. Second, in a.11 ca.ses, the criteria do not consider the conditions 
1In gonoral, a tosting critorion would havo to tako roquiromonts and/or sprcificat.ions into account t.o do so. 
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required to guarantee that erroneous behavior is observable and a failure is revealed. Instead, 
the rules may introduce an erroneous intermediate value caused by a corresponding fault, 
but do not guarantee that such a value affects the output or externa! environment (in fact, 
we show that in most cases they do not even guarantee effect on the intermediate state of 
the program variables). The erroneous intermediate values are often masked out by later 
computations. This extremely common occurrence is coincidental correctness, which is the 
bane of testing. Coincidental correctness occurs when no failure is detected, even though 
a fault has been executed; thus the effort put into selecting the data and the associated 
execution is for naught. 
Section 2 surveys related works in fault-based testing and compares them to our work 
on RE LAY. Section 3 defines terminology and presents notation used la.ter to describe the 
RELA Y model and the analyzed testing criteria. Section 4 summarizes the RELA Y model and 
developing failure conditions that guarantee fault detection. We present the detail necessary 
to understand the analysis in this paper and only briefly describe other aspects of the model 
(more detailed presentations appear in other papers [RT86c, RT88, Tho91]). Section 5 de-
scribes an application of the model to develop fa.Hure conditions for fault classes and illustrates 
that application for one fault class. The fa.Hure conditions for six fault classes are developed 
in [RT86b] and provided in the appendix. In section 6, we use the model and these fa.Hure 
conditions to analyze the fault detection capabilities of three fault-based test data selection 
criteria for these six fault classes. In conclusion, we discuss the implications of the analysis 
and our future plans for RELAY. 
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2 Related Fault-based Testing Work 
Fault-based testing criteria consist, in some sense, of "fault-specific rules" intended to detect 
particular fault types. Fault-based heuristics have been used by testers since the dawn of 
programming. Such heuristics are employed by exa.mining the source code and selecting test 
data sensitive to commonly occurring faults. Myers outlines many such heuristics [Mye79]. 
The attempts to formalize fault-based testing have a comrnon underlying theme: distin-
guishing the test prograrn from alternatives in a set of related prograrns. This approach as-
sumes the test progra.m is "almost correct" and differs from sorne hypothetical correct progra.m 
by at most some definable faults (the competent programmer hypothesis [DLS78, DLS79]). 
This near correctness might be determined by successfully passing some high-level functional 
testing phase or by satisfying sorne structural testing criterion. In its various forms, this 
assumption is taken to mean that the hypothetical correct program is in the "neighborhood" 
of the test program. Budd and Angluin formalize the notion of "program correctness within 
a neighborhood of alternate programs'' [BA80]; assuming the correct program is within the 
neighborhood of the test program, then a test set that distinguishes the test program from 
each alternate program in the neighborhood is reliable [How76, GG75] for the test program. 
A fault-based testing criterion defines a neighborhood by the class of faults that it considers. 
The broader the class of fauits considered, and hence the larger the neighborhood, the more 
confidence we gain in the testing activity. 
Formal fault-based testing criteria use one of two techniques: either they measure the 
adequacy of pre-selected test data or they guide test data selection. In what follows, we first 
discuss several fault-based test data measurement criteria and then describe several fault-
based test data selection criteria. It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully compare these 
criteria. We provide slightly more detail on those criteria that are most similar to the RELAY 
model; more thorough surveys of fault-based testing and their relation to RELAY appear 
elsewhere [RT86a, RT86c, Tho91]. 
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The ea.rliest forma.lized fault-ba.sed testing criteria. were introduced independently by Ha.m-
let a.nd by DeMillo, Lipton a.nd Sayward. Both criteria. seed particular types of faults into the 
test progra.m a.nd mea.sure the a.dequacy of a set of test data. selected by some other mea.ns 
in terms of its a.bility to detect the seeded faults. Ha.mlet 's testing with the aid of a compiler 
[Ha.m77] seeds fa.ults a.s alterna.tive expressions that are "simpler" than the original expres-
sion in the source code. An extended compiler instruments the code to compare the va.lues 
computed by ea.ch alterna.te a.nd the corresponding original expression for the pre-selected 
test da.ta. a.nd reports those alterna.tes tha.t are not distinguished. Mutation analysis [DLS78], 
introduced by DeMillo, Lipton, a.nd Sa.ywa.rd, seeds simple, single-token fa.ults into the source 
code to produce "muta.nt" progra.ms. The system then executes the original a.nd muta.nt 
progra.ms on the pre-selected test da.ta. a.nd determines which muta.nts a.re "killed" - tha.t 
is, which produce different output results from the original for a.t lea.st one test da.tum. For 
botl~ these criteria., the tester a.ugments the test da.ta. set itera.tively to elimina.te the seeded 
faults tha.t ha.ve not yet been distinguished and tha.t are determined not to be equivalent to 
the original code. The underlying philosophy is that in the process of finding a.11 seeded fa.ults 
a.11y actual, possibly more complex, faults in the source code will a.lso be eliminated ( which is 
founded on belief in the coupling effect [DLS78, DLS79]). 
These two criteria. require explicit constructio11 a.nd execution ( or a.t best pa.rtia.l inter-
pretation) of ma.ny alterna.te programs. Two more recent fault-ba.sed measureme11t criteria., 
developed independently by Morell a.nd Zeil, a.re more ana.lytica.lly-ba.sed. Ra.ther tha.11 mea.-
sure a. pre-selected test da.ta set through execution, both criteria. a.na.lyze the test da.ta. set 
a.nd the program to determine faults tha.t could exist in the progra.m tha.t would rema.in un-
detected by execution on the test da.ta.. Morell's criterion is ba.sed 011 a fault-based testing 
model [Mor84] that introduces two concepts: "creation" of a.n initia.l erroneous sta.te a.fter 
the sta.teme11t conta.i11i11g a. fault, a.11d its "propa.gation" to the output. Crea.tion a.nd prop-
a.ga.tion conditions a.re described that a.re sufficient for a. fault to crea.te a.n erroneous state 
tha.t propaga.tes to the output. Morell's model provided the ba.sis for our initial work 011 the 
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RELAY model2. In Symbolic fault-based testing [Mor88, Mor90], Morell uses his model to 
symbolically represent faults that would not be detected by execution on a pre-selected test 
data set. Zeil's criterion describes functional descriptions of "perturbations" that correspond 
to fault cla.sses [Zei83J. Perturbation testing [Zei84, Zei89] thereby identifies faults of a par-
ticular functional cla.ss that would not introduce an incorrect state and hence would not be 
detected by the pre-selected test data set. Perturbation testing also determines if the output 
is partially dependent on the perturbation, thus checking to see if it could produce a failure, 
but <loes not explicitly describe this dependence. 
Fault-based test data measurement <loes not provide much guidance as to how to select 
test data to elimina.te the faults considered. Severa! fault-based testing criteria more directly 
guide the test data selection process. Foster introduced the idea of conditions under which a 
fault manifests itself a.s an erroneous value [Fos80]. Foster's error-sensitive test case analysis 
consists of conditions sufficient to distinguish expressions that may contain a fault from the 
correct expression for several fault classes. In weak mutation testing [How78J, more recently 
called fault-based functional testing [How85], Howden refined these conditions and introduced 
others. Wea.k mutation testing is applied to the low level "functions" (e.g., statements) in a 
program. Functional testing [How85, How87] augments this low-level testing by test selection 
rules applicable to the synthesis of functions from component functions, which ha.ve already 
been tested. 
Two extensions to mutation analysis are oriented toward test data selection to assist in 
satisfying mutation testing. In his mutation testing suite, Budd included the Estima te compo-
nent (for error-sensitive test monitoring) [Bud83], which has conditions that must minimally 
be satisfied to detect sorne of the mutant classes in expressions containing them. Offutt 
described constraint-based testing [DGK+ss¡ as a part of the MoTHRA mutation analysis 
system. This criterion defines constraints on a test data set required for the set to be mu-
tation adequate. There are three types of constraints: "reachability" conditions guarantee 
2 Wo highlight tlw significa.nt difforoncos at tho ond of this survoy and in tho conclusion. 
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that a mutant is executed; "necessary" conditions guarantee that a mutant is detected at 
the statement containing it; and "sufficiency" conditions guarantee that the mutant affects 
the output. The MOTHRA system explicitly selects test data to satisfy the reachability and 
necessary conditions. Program execution on such test data is compared with mutant program 
execution to determine if the mutant has been killed; if it has not been killed, additional test 
data is tried in an effort to also satisfy the sufficiency conditions. Offutt thus recognizes the 
need to affect the output but provides no guidance in developing the sufficiency conditions or 
selecting data to satisfy them. 
These condition-based criteria have three major weaknesses. First and foremost, they are 
not easily extensible; they provide specific rules rather than defining a general framework 
within which test data selection rules can be defined for particular faults. Second, these 
criteria focus only on introducing erroneous behavior, either at the fault location or at the 
statement containing the fault; there is no guarantee that a failure will be observable. Third, 
many of the rules that comprise these criteria are sufficient but not necessary to introduce 
erroneous behavior; if a rule is unsatisfiable, therefore, faults of the associated class may not 
be detected. 
The RELAY model differs significantly from each of the fault-based testing criteria de-
scribed here. The RELAY model is most similar to Morell's work [Mor88]. We introduce 
concepts similar to Morell's creation and propagation; our origination and transfer3 refer to 
the first erroneous evaluation and the persistence of that erroneous behavior, respectively. We 
refine Morell's theory by more precisely defining origination and by differentiating between 
the transfer of a potential failure through computations and its transfer through information 
fiow. This refinement facilita.tes defining fault-based rules for test data selection, whereas 
Morell's model is used for test data measurement. Moreover, RELAY considers information 
3 Wo havo choson tlic torm "originato" ratlicr than "croat.o" or ''introduce", bccausc wc focl it bcttcr connotrs 
tho first location at which an crroncous cvaluation occurs and <loes not imply thc mistakc a programmor makos 
whilc coding. Wo havc choscn thc torm ''transfcr" ovcr ''propagatc" so as to avoid thc connotation of an 
•'incrcaso in.numbors'' and instcad of ·'pC'rsist" so as not to confiict with Glass's notion [Gla81], whcrC' an C'rror 
is porsistont if it escapos dctcction until lato in dcvclopmcnt. 
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flow transfer through both data dependence and control dependence, whereas Morell's model 
<loes not consider propagation through control dependence. In what follows, we outline the 
RELAY model and describe its potential use for test data selection. In the conclusion, we 
return to the features that distinguish RELAY from other fault-based testing criteria. 
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3 A Framework for Testing 
A number of test data selection criteria have been proposed throughout the years. These cri-
teria, however, ha.ve been defined imprecisely. Here, we outline a representation of programs, 
execution, and testing, which provides a framework within which test data selection criteria 
can be formally defined. This formality results in greater precision in defining the criteria as 
well as a consistent base for evaluating and comparing the criteria. The full definition of this 
framework is provided in [RT86a], a.long with the complete, formal definitions of the three 
fault-ba.sed testing criteria defined and analyzed in section 6. This framework also serves as 
the foundation for the RELAY model, which is described in section 4. 
We consider the testing of a module, where a module is a procedure or function with a 
single entry point. A module M implements some function FM, which maps an input vector 
x in a doma.in XM to an output vector z = M(x) in a range ZM, FM : XM ---"* ZM. A 
module implementation M can be represented by a control flow graph CM that describes 
the possible flow of control through the module - CM= (N,E), where Nis a (finite) set 
of nodes and E ~ N x N is the set of edges. N includes a unique start node n,•tart and a 
unique final node n¡inal· Each other node in N represents a simple statement, a group of 
simple statements, or the predica.te of a conditional statement in M. Associated with ea.ch 
edge (nki n1) is a branch predica.te, BP(nki n1), which is the condition that must hold to allow 
control to pass directly from node n1.: to node n1• If a node has a single successor node, then 
the branch predicate associated with the edge leaving the node is sirnply true. 
The control flow graph defines the paths within a module. A subpath in a control flow 
graph CM = (N, E) is a finite, possibly empty, sequence of nodes p = [n¡1 , n¡2 , ... , n¡ 1P1] such 
that for all i, 1 :::; i < IPI, (n¡i' n¡i+t) E E. An initial path pis a subpath whose first node 
is n.,turt· For any node n E N, the set INIT(n) contains all initial paths in CM whose last 
node is n. A path P 4 is an initial path whose last node is n¡inal· The set of ali paths in 
4 Wlwre tite distinction between a subpath and a pat.h is important., we will use an upper case IC'ttcr ( P) to 
signify a path and a lower case !et.ter (p) for a subpath (or initial pat.h). 
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GM is denoted by PATHS(GM)i note that PATHS(GM) = INIT(n¡inal)· The graph GM is 
well-formed if and only if every no de in N occurs along some path in PATHS( G M); in our 
analysis, we consider only modules with well-formed control ftow graphs. 
An initial path p of M may be executed on some input x; this execution is denoted p(x). 
Associated with execution of an initial path p on input x is a state Sp(:r.), which defines the 
state of the computation. Sp(:r.) is a vector of values for all variables and the value of the last 
branch predicate (denoted by the dummy variable BP) after execution of p(x). When we are 
not particular about what initial path was executed but only a state at node n, we denote 
that state Sn( l:). When we are not concerned about a particular input, we denote tha.t sta.te 
Sn. 
Each node in the control ftow graph can be represented as a.n expression tree, where the 
leaf no des represent data obj ects a.nd the internal no des represent operators. A subexpression 
of a. statement is then represented by a subtree of the node's expression tree. To denote 
a so urce code expression, E X P ( upper ca.se) is used. An expression evalua.ted over the 
module's state Sn is denoted exp (lower ca.se). The expression for an m-a.ry operator may 
be represented OP (EXP1,EXP2, ... ,EXPm)i for convenience, a binary expression may be 
written EX Pi OP EX P2. 
A test datum t for a module M with control ftow graph GM = (N, E) is a sequence of 
values input a.long some initial path - tha.t is, t = [t1 , .. .,(.]. The domain of an initial pa.th 
p, denoted dom(p), is the set of test da.ta t for which p can be execu ted. For a.ny no de n in 
G M, the set dom(n) 5 is the set of all test da.ta t for which n can be executed -
dom(n) = LJ dom(p). 
p EINIT(n) 
Note tha.t dom(nfinal) = XM. A test da.tum t ma.y be a complete sequence of input va.lues 
- tha.t is, 3P E PATHS(GM), t E dom(P) - or incomplete - tha.t is, 'ef PE PATHS(GM), 
5Wo ovorload tho tlom notation, but thoro should bo no confusion botwoon application to nodos and appli-
cation to paths. 
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t ~ dom(P). A test datum t may be incomplete simply beca.use after executing some initial 
path p, additional input is needed to complete execution of sorne path, or there may not be any 
additional data to complete t, because the initial input t may cause the module to termina.te 
abnormally (befo re n fiirnl) or possibly never to termina te. This allows for evaluation of testing 
criteria that consider invalid inputs, which are not in the domain of M but for which M may 
initiate execution. The test data domain DM for GM = (N, E) is the domain of inputs 
from which test data can be selected, DM = {t l 3 n EN, t E dom(n)}. Note that Du is not 
merely the domain of M, since neither invalid input values nor initial test data are in XM -
in fact, DM = dom(n3tnrt) 6. 
Testing typically specifies sorne subset of the test data domain for execution. A test data 
set Tu for a module M is a finite subset of the test data domain, Tu ~ DM. A test data 
selection criterion, or simply a criterion, C is a relation between modules and test data 
sets such that if (M, Tu) E C, then the T,u satisfies C for M. A criterion, then, is a set of 
rules for determining whether a test data set satisfies selection requirements for a particular 
module. 
Execution of a module on test data does little good unless the resulting behavior is judged. 
A test oracle [How78, HE78, Wey82] is a means ofrecognizing (un)acceptable, or (in)correct, 
behavior of a module. More formally, an oracle O(Xo, Zo) is a relation on Xo x Zo, 
O = { ( x, z)} e X 0 x Zo 7 ; X o is the domain of the oracle and Zo is the range of the oracle. 
When ( x, z) E O, z represents acceptable behavior for x. Ideally, the oracle domain is the 
module's test data domain so that for any possible test, the oracle will judge the module's 
behavior8 . An "externa!" oracle verifies the module's externa! behavior, or output9, for input 
6If thc run-timc systcm docs not disablc initiat.ion of a module on any invalid input, thcn thc test data 
Jomain D.u is thc universo of ali possiblc input SC'qucnccs 
7Notc that an orado rclation allows nondctcrminism, whcrc multiplc acccptablc out.pttt.s are spccificd for 
an input, and a.Isa allows incomplckncss, whcrc ·'don't caro" cases can be spccificd. 
8This allows thc oraclc to cvaluatc robu.stnc.ss (rcasonablc bchavior on nncxpcctcd inputs) as wcll as cor· 
rcctnc.s.s (spccificd bchavior on valiJ inputs) 
ºWc will oft.cn rcfcr to an output whcn wc mC'an a.ny externa! bchavior. Note also, t.liat an externa! oraclc 
may rcquirc additional information. such as timing, to cnable it to vcrify corrcct bchavior. 
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da.ta.. Thus, for a.n externa.! ora.ele O, (x, z) E O mea.ns z is a.n a.ccepta.ble output for x. A test 
ora.ele might specify a.ccepta.ble beha.vior by a. functiona.l representa.tion, correct version of the 
module (a. "gold progra.m"), input/output pa.irs, simply a. tester who can a.ccura.tely eva.luate 
the module's beha.vior, or be derived from a. formal specification [RA092]. A module M is 
correct with respect to an ora.ele O if the module produces a.ccepta.ble beha.vior for a.ll va.lid 
inputs -'</x E XM, (x,M(x)) E O. 
A tester often has a. concept of the "correct" intermedia.te beha.vior in a.ddition to its 
correct output. Ra.ther tha.n wa.iting until output is produced to judge beha.vior, the tester 
might check the computation of the module at intermedia.te points, as one does when us-
ing a. run-time debugger. This a.pproach to testing is supported by an ora.ele tha.t ineludes 
information a.bout intermedia.te va.lues that should be computed by the module. Such infor-
ma.tion might be derived from some correct module, a.n axioma.tic specification, self-checking 
a.ssertions [LvH85], run-time traces [How78], or simply a. tester who evalua.tes intermedia.te 
beha.vior. A state oracle Os is a. relation Os = {((t,p), Ap(t¡)}, tha.t relates a test daturn 
a.nd a.n initia.l path ( t, p) to one or more acceptance sta.tes Ap(t), whic specify an acceptable 
vector of va.ria.ble va.lues and the last bra.nch predica.te value after execution of p(t). If for a.ny 
test datum t, sa.tisfaction of the sta.te ora.ele for execution of a.11 initial pa.ths on t implies the 
externa.! ora.ele is satisfied - '</t '</p: t E dom(p), ((t,p), Sp(t¡) E Os ::::} (t, M(t)) E O - then 
the sta.te ora.ele and the externa.! ora.ele for a. module are consistent. Note tha.t the reverse 
is not true - tha.t is, the external ora.ele ma.y be sa.tisfied while the sta.te ora.ele wa.s viola.ted 
a.t some point a.long the pa.th. 
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4 RELA Y: A Model of Fault Detection 
The RELAY model has two principal uses. First, it provides testing criteria. tha.t under certain 
assumptions a.re ca.pable of guara.nteeing fault detection for chosen fa.ult classes. The RELAY 
testing criteria can be used to select test data or to measure the adequacy of test data selected 
by a.nother criterion to detect such faults. This use is described in [RT88], a.nd the underlying 
assumptions are eva.luated in [TRC92J. Second, RELAY provides a mea.ns of analyzing test 
data selection criteria.'s fa.ult detection capabilities. It is this second a.pplica.tion tha.t is the 
focus of this paper. This section defines the RELAY model, but only to the extent required 
for the a.na.lysis presented in sections that follow. More formal definitions of the model a.nd 
its terminology can be found elsewhere [Tho91]. 
The failures considered within the RELAY modelare those caused by faults in the module's 
source code. The fa.ult-based testing approach relies on two basic assumptions, as does RE LAY. 
The first assumption is that the module being tested is "a.lrnost correct". This assumption 
is similar to the competent programmer hypothesis [DLS78], which states that the module 
being tested bears a strong resemblance to sorne hypothetica.1, correct module or differs from 
the correct module by some sma.11 set of fa.ults. Such a module need not actua.lly exist, but 
we assume that the tester is capa.ble of producing a correct module from the given module 
and knowledge of the fa.ults detected. In the application described here, RELAY is limited 
to faults that do not change the program schema although the model supports extensions 
to more complex fa.ults. Second, we assume either that there is a single fault in the module 
or that multiple faults do not interact to mask ea.ch other. This is called the non-masking 
faults assumption and is similar to an assumption based on the coupling effect [DLS78], which 
states tha.t detection of single, simple faults is sufficient to detect multiple or complex faults. 
The RELAY model addresses faults independently in the formulation presented in this paper. 
Although these assumptions may seem overly restrictive, the RELAY model allows us eva.luate 
the implications of these assumptions and with further development may allow us to tone them 
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down a bit [Tho91, TRC92]. 
Development of the RELAY model was motivated by studying the problems of coincidental 
correctness, where a node containing a fa.ult may be executed yet not reveal a failure; thus, 
the module appears correct, but just by coincidence of the test data selected. It is also 
possible that the tested module produces correct output for a.11 input (not just the selected 
data) despite a discrepancy between it a.nd the hypothetica.1, correct module. In this ca.se, the 
module is actually correct, not merely coincidenta.lly correct. Reca.11 that a fault is a synta.ctic 
rl.efect in the source code and a fa.Hure is observable incorrect behavior. A potential failure 
is an intermedia.te incorrect result ( which ma.y potentially lead to a fa.Hure). For a fa.ult to 
cause a fa.Hure, a potential fa.Hure must originate a.t the faulty node and transfer through 
computa.tions and a.long information flow to a fa.Hure. Subsection 4.1 describes the RELAY 
model of fa.ults and f ailures. One a.pplication of the RE LAY model is the construction of failure 
conditions that guarantee fault detection; this application in outlined in subsection 4.2. 
4.1 The RELAY Model 
The RELAY model describes how a fault ca.uses a fa.Hure to occur on execution for some 
test datum10. A fa.Hure occurs when execution of a module on sorne test datum causes an 
observable incorrect behavior, which most commonly takes the form of incorrect output. 
Revealing a fa.Hure by testing necessitates an ora.ele to verify the module's correct externally 
observable behavior. 
A failure is an unacceptable result of execution of M on some test datum t -
that is, M(t) such that (t, M(t)) ~ 0.11 
A fa.Hure is caused by one or more fa.ults in a module. A fa.ult may be thought of as a 
transformation applied to some expression in the source code that would correct the fa.ult a.nd 
10In ali ddinitions t.lrnt follow, we use the notation introduccd in sed.ion 3: M is the givcn module hcing 
tcstcd; G.u = (N,E) is t.lw control flow graph of M; M* is the hypothetical, corrcct module; t is a test tlatum. 
while lvf(t) is thc cxccut.ion of M on t. 
11 Wc assumc that if a module has not tcrminatcd aft.er some finito time pcriod, this is incorrcct bchavior for 
which the orado rcvcals a failure. Thus, the oracle may requirc information other t.lian the oxpcctcd output 
values. 
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produce a correct module. 
A fault f is a transformed expression f (E X P) in M su ch that f (E X P) = E X P*, 
where EX P* is the corresponding expression in the hypothetica{, correct module 
M*, and execution of E X P reveals a failure for some test datum. 
For a fault to cause a fa.Hure, execution must first introduce a potential fa.Hure, which is 
later reflected in the execution state, and is eventually externally observable. 
A potential failure is the incorrect evaluation exp of some expression EX P 12 
in M on some test datum t when exp :j:. exp*, where EX P* is the corresponding 
expression in M*. 
In the context of a state oracle, a potential failure may be observed in the module's state, 
which is termed a state failure. 
A state (potential] failure is an incorrect state revealed when partía{ execution 
of M on test datum t for initial path p is not accepted by the state oracle Os 
((t,p), sp(t¡) rf. Os. 
A state failure exists after execution of an initial path when a variable is assigned an incorrect 
value or when the last branch predicate evaluates incorrectly. 
The RELAY model describes the ways in which a potential fault manifests itself as a fa.Hure. 
Consider first how a potential fa.Hure is introduced. Some fault transformations affect code 
that cannot by itself be evaluated (such as an operator), thus we consider introduction of a 
potential failure in the smallest valued expression that contains the fault. Introduction of the 
first potential fa.Hure is termed origination. 
A potential failure originates for some test datum t executing a fault f in M in 
the smallest evaluable expression EX P containing f at node n when exp :j:. exp* 
over Sn(t), where f (EX P) = EX P* and EX P* is the corresponding expression 
in M*. 
The first potential failure, which occurs at origination, is termed the original potential failure. 
Consider the module in Figure 1, for example. Suppose that the statement X := U* V 
at node 1 contains a variable reference fault and should be X := B* V. A potential failure 
12Recall tha.t upper case, EXP. is used here to denote thc sourcc-code cxpression, while lowcr case, e:cp, 
denotes the cxpression eva.luatcd over thc module's sta.tc. 
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l:X :=U* V 
2:U := V**2 
3:Y :=(X+ 3)**Z 
/al.se .----___.,__ __ ___, 
4:if A< B 
5:W :=Y* Z 
7:W:=X*B 
6:output X 
8:output W 
Figure 1: Module for Explanation of RELA Y 
originates in the smallest evaluable expression containing the fault, which is the reference 
to U, whenever the value of U differs from the value of B - u =f. b. On the other hand, 
su ppose that no de 1 contains an ari thmetic operator fault and should be X := U+ V. Then, 
the smallest evaluable expression is U* V (since * cannot be evaluated), which originates a 
potential failure whenever the value of U* V differs from the value of U +V - U*V =f. u+v. 
Once a potential failure originates, it must not be masked out by computations at the 
faulty node so that it causes a state failure and also must not be masked out later before a 
failure is revealed. When a potential failure in sorne expression is not masked out but rather 
causes a "super"-expression that references it to evaluate incorrectly, we say the potential 
failure transfers. The RELAY model defines three types of transfer: computational transfer, 
data dependence transfer, and control dependence transfer. 
Within a node, a potential failure must transfer through all parent operators in that node 
to affect evaluation of the entire node. 
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A potential failure EX P in M for some test datum t computationally transfers 
to a parent expression O P( ... EX P ... ) when op( ... exp ... ) :f. op( ... exp* ... ) over Sn(t), 
where exp :f. exp* over Sn(t) and exp* is the corresponding expression in M*. 
Ta.ke a.nother look a.t Figure l. If V holds the va.lue zero, the original potential fa.Hure 
in U in no de 1 <loes not tra.nsfer to a.ffect the a.ssignment to X; the original potential failure 
tra.nsfers, on the other ha.nd, whenever V is nonzero. 
Incorrect evalua.tion of a. node requires computa.tiona.l tra.nsfer through a.11 pa.rent opera.tors 
of the original potentia.l failure. This results in a sta.te failure, which may be reflected in a. 
va.ria.ble with a.n incorrect va.lue or the incorrect selection of a bra.nch. The first sta.te failure, 
which occurs when the node containing a. fault eva.lua.tes incorrectly, is termed the original 
sta.te failure. 
While it is true tha.t no failure ca.u be revea.led if a.n original sta.te failure is not first in-
troduced, it is a.lso the ca.se tha.t a.u original sta.te fa.Hure ma.y be revealed only when a. sta.te 
ora.ele of some sort is a.va.Ha.ble. If only a.n externa.! ora.ele is a.va.Ha.ble, the original sta.te failure 
must tra.nsfer to a.ffect subsequent nodes until a. failure (incorrect output) is produced. In-
formation flow transfer, whereby a. sta.te fa.Hure a.ffects a. subsequent node, is ba.sed on the 
concept of informa.tion flow [DD77, FOW87, HPR88] a.nd the progra.m dependence relations 
discussed in [Pod89, PC90]. Informa.tion flow tra.nsfer occurs when the sta.te fa.Hure, which is 
reflected in the va.lue of sorne va.ria.ble, is used a.t a. subsequent node either 1) to incorrectly 
define a. va.ria.ble ( e.g., in a.n a.ssignment sta.tement) or to incorrectly defined the bra.nch pred-
ica.te (e.g., in a. conditional predica.te sta.tement), or 2) to define a. va.ria.ble on a.n incorrectly 
selected bra.nch differently tha.n if the correct bra.nch had been selected. These a.re termed 
data dependence transfer a.nd control dependence transfer, respectively. For a. fa.ult 
to ca.use a. failure, the original sta.te fa.Hure must tra.nsfer a.long some informa.tion flow chain(s) 
from the fa.ulty node to a. fa.Hure node. An informa.tion flow cha.in is a. sequence of nodes such 
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fault 
var-use 
state/bp 
failure 
var-definition 
incorrect branch 
state/Var 
fallure 
Figure 2: RELAY Model of Fault Detection 
reveal failure 
that each node is either data dependent13 or control dependent14 on the previous node in the 
chain. Thansfer along an information flow chain requires data or c.ontrol dependence transfer 
at each link in the chain. Using the example of Figure 1 again, the potential failure in X 
transfers through data dependence to a use, say at node 7, where it transfers through the 
computations to produce a state failure in W, and then transfers to the output of W at node 
8. The RELAY model of information flow transfer includes a framework within which the 
components of data and control dependence transfer fit and which identifies the interaction 
between multiple information flow chains. lt is beyond the scope of this paper to present 
the full details of information fiow transfer; moreover, they are not critica! to the analysis 
presented in this paper. Precise definitions of information flow transfer and that aspect of 
the model may be found elsewhere [Tho91, TRC92]. 
Figure 2 illustrates the RELA Y model of fault detection and how this model provides for 
the discovery of a fault. The conditions under which a fault is detected are (1) origination of. 
13on a node n; when a variable V defined at n; is used at n; and there is a def-clear path with respect to V 
from n; ton;. 
u control dependent on a node n; if n; determines whether n; is executed. 
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a potential failure in the smallest valued expression containing the fault; (2) computational 
transfer of that potential failure through each operator in the node, thereby revealing a 
original state failure by a state oracle; (3) information flow transfer of the state failure to an 
assignment or branch predicate node on the path that references the incorrect state; either 
( 4) computational transfer through the assignment node producing a state failure variable, or 
(5) computational transfer through the branch predicate node producing a state failure BP 
and assigrnnent of a variable on the selected branch differently than on the correct branch 
thereby producing a state failure variable; and (6) cycle through (3) and ( 4 or 5) until a 
failure is revealed by an externa! oracle15• 
16 Note that data dependence transfer is a sequence of var-use, repeated computational transfer, and var-
definition (atan assignment) transitions, while control dependence transfer is a sequence of var-use, repeated 
computational transfer, bp-definition, and var-definition (on the incorrect branch) transitions. 
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The RELAY view of fault detection has a.n illustra.tive a.na.logy in a. rela.y ra.ce, as shown in 
Figure 3, hence the na.me of our model. The starting blocks correspond to the fault loca.tion. 
The ta.ke off of the first runner, a.s the gun sounds the beginning of the ra.ce, is a.na.logous to 
the origina.tion of a. potentia.l failure. A runner ca.rrying the ha.ton through one leg of the ra.ce 
corresponds to the computa.tiona.l tra.nsfer of the failure through a. sta.tement. The successful 
completion of a. leg of the ra.ce has a. pa.rallel in revea.ling a. state failure, a.nd the pa.ssing of 
the ha.ton from one runner to the next is a.na.logous to informa.tion fiow tra.nsfer of the f ailure 
from one sta.tement to a.nother. The ra.ce goes on untH the finish line is crossed, which is 
a.nalogous to the test ora.ele revea.ling a. failure. 
Our goal, of course, is to complete the rela.y ra.ce a.nd a.nalogously to detect fa.ults. To this 
end, the RELAY model forms the ha.sis for conditions that define how to guara.ntee tha.t a. fa.ult 
origina.tes a potentia.l fa.Hure a.nd tra.nsfer occurs until a. fa.Hure is revea.led. This a.pplication 
of the RELAY model is outlined in the next subsection. 
4.2 Failure Conditions 
U sing the concepts of origina.tion a.nd tra.nsfer, RELA Y also models failure conditions tha.t are 
necessa.ry a.nd sufficient to guarantee fa.ult detection - that is, sa.tisfa.ction of these conditions 
for a. fault mea.ns tha.t a. potentia.l failure originates a.nd tra.nsfers untH a fa.Hure can be revealed 
by the ora.ele. Sufficient mea.ns tha.t if the module is executed on da.ta. tha.t sa.tisfies the 
conditions a.nd the node is fa.ulty, then a. failure is revealed. Necessary, on the other ha.nd, 
mea.ns tha.t if a fa.Hure is revealed then the module must have been executed on da.ta. tha.t 
sa.tisfies the condition a.nd the node is fa.ulty16 . Thus, the failure conditions a.re the unique 
conditions to guara.ntee fa.ult detection. 
The RELAY model describes how a particular fa.ult ca.uses a. fa.Hure a.nd is thus dependent 
on knowledge of the fa.ult. Since this is unlikely ( otherwise one would simply fix the fault), 
applica.tion of RELAY hypothesizes tha.t a. node is fa.ulty a.nd considers how such a hypothetical 
16This holds only in thc contcxt of a single fault 
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fault causes a failure, if indeed it is a fault. 
A hypothetical fault f is a transformation to some expression EX P in M 
such that f(EXP) = EXP', where EXP' is an alternative expression in the 
hypothetically correct module M', which is identical to M except for E X P and is 
corre et if f is a fa ult. 
Note that we now talk of a hypothetically correct module, since we can easily describe this 
module. 
The failure condition to detect a hypothetical fault guarantees an original state failure 
is introduced and is transferred a.long an information ftow cha.in to output. The analysis 
presented in this paper is concerned only with guaranteeing original state failures, so we 
focus on the original state failure condition, which consists of an origination condition and 
computational transfer conditions. 
The failure conditions are developed below for a hypothetical fault f independent of where 
the faulty node n occurs in the module; the conditions are constraints on the module's state 
before execution of n. To guarantee fault detection, the failure conditions must be true when 
evaluated over this state. In conjunction with the doma.in of the faulty node (dom(n)), the 
failure condition describes a test data set, where execution of any single test datum in the 
set would execute the faulty node and reveal a failure 17 . Beca.use the failure conditions are 
necessary, if the conditions are infeasible within dom(n), then no failure can be revealed 
and the hypothetical fault is not a fault. Although, in general, the feasibility problem is 
undecidable, in practice, it can often be solved. 
The origination condition guarantees that the smallest valued expression containing a hy-
pothetical fault originates a potential failure (hence that the hypothetically faulty expression 
evaluates differently than the hypothetically correct one). 
The origination condition for a hypothetical fault f in M in the smallest evalu-
able expression EX P containing f at node n is [exp =!= exp'] evaluated over Sn, 
where f(EXP) = EXP' and EX P' is the corresponding expression in M'. 
17 A stato failuro would bo rovoalod for an original stato failuro condition, and an oxtornal failuro would bo 
rovoalod if information ftow transfor conditions aro addod. 
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When the origination condition is infeasible, the hypothetically faulty expression is equivalent 
to the alternate, and no such fault exists. 
The original potential fa.Hure for a hypothetical fault must transfer to aJfect evaluation of 
the entire node. A computational transfer condition guarantees that a potential failure in an 
operand transfers through a parent operator so that the parent expression is a potential fa.Hure 
(hence that the parent expression referencing the hypothetical fault evaluates differently than 
the hypothetically correct parent expression). 
The computational transfer condition for an expression OP( ... , EX P, ... ) 
containing a potential failure exp in M at node n is [op( ... exp ... ) .¡:. op( ... exp' ... )] 
evaluated over Sn, where exp # exp1 over Sn and EX P' is the corresponding 
expression in A11• 
When a computational transfer condition is infeasible, the potential failure cannot transfer 
to affect the parent expression; as above, the hypothetically faulty expression is equivalent to 
the alternate one and no such fault exists. 
The conjunction of the computational transfer conditions for each ancestor operator in the 
node of the originating expression guarantees transfer to aJfect the entire node and produce an 
original state fa.Hure. To guarantee a fault's detection by revealing an original state failure, 
the origination and the computational transfer conditions for all ancestor operators in the 
node must be jointly satisfied. 
The original state failure condition for a hypothetical fault f in M at nade n 
is the conjunction of the origination condition for f and ali computational transfer 
conditions for f and n. 
Asan example of an original state failure condition, consider again the module in Figure l. 
Hypothesize that staternent X := U* V at node 1 should be X := B *V, then the origination 
condition is [u .¡:. b]. This original potential fa.Hure must transfer through the rnultiplication 
by V; the corresponding cornputational transfer condition is (u * v # b * v), which simplifies 
to (v # O). This value rnust then transfer through the assignment to X, which is trivial. 
Thus, the original state fa.Hure condition resulting from this hypothetical fa.ult is [ (u # b) and 
(v #O)]. 
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For the a.na.lysis presented in this pa.per, we consider only the original state fa.Hure con-
ditions, beca.use, as we will show, most fault-based testing criteria do not even satisfy these. 
Typically, however, testing is primarily concerned with revea.ling an output fa.Hure as the 
manifestation of a fault ( and not only incorrect intermedia.te values). To a.ddress this, the 
RELAY model provides a fra.rnework for developing faHure conditions to guara.ntee tha.t asta.te 
fa.Hure transfers to a.ffect module execution as a whole. It does so by extending the fa.Hure 
condition to a.lso gua.rantee that the original state fa.Hure transfers a.long some information 
flow chain(s) from the faulty node to a fa.Hure node. The information flow tra.nsfer conditions 
guarantee that da.ta and/ or control dependen ce transfer occurs at ea.ch link in the informa.tion 
flow chain(s). Consider again the hypothetical variable reference fa.ult at node 1 in Figure l. 
One information flow cha.in from the fault loca.tion to an output consists of the definition of 
X at node 1, followed by a use of X a.t node 7, where W is defined, followed by a use of W 
in the output statement a.t no de 8. The potential failure in X tra.nsfers through informa.tion 
flow to node 7 whenever the false bra.nch of the conditional at node 4 is taken. Reference to 
the potential fa.Hure in X must transfer through the multiplication by B to the assignment 
of W a.t node 7. Thus, for this information flow cha.in, the transfer condition is [(a;::: b) and 
(b i= O)j. Reca.11 tha.t the original sta.te fa.Hure condition is [(u i= b) and (v i= O)], creating 
a fa.Hure condition for this information flow cha.in of [(u i= b) a.nd (v i= O) and (a ;::: b) and 
(b i= O)]. The development of information flow transfer conditions and failure conditions is 
fully defined in [Tho91J, as a.re the deta.Hs of da.ta dependence tra.nsfer, control dependence 
tra.nsfer, and complex computational transfer (in the context of interacting potential fa.H-
ures). As mentioned, these are not required for the ana.lysis presented in this paper, so we 
ha.ve merely provided a general description to portray the full na.ture of the RELAY model. 
The fa.Hure conditions describe what is required to gua.rantee that a fault produces a 
fa.Hure. Thus, they define test data that nmst be executed to reveal a fa.Hure for a hypothetical 
fa.ult. This mea.ns tha.t if a fa.Hure is not revea.led for da.ta in the doma.in of the hypothetically 
fa.ulty node a.nd satisfying the failure condition, then the hypothetical fa.ult is not a fa.ult (for 
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any test data that could execute the node) and hence the hypothetically correct module is 
not correct. On the other hand, revealing a failure for such data indicates that the module 
contains the hypothetical fault. In the case of the original state failure condition, we only 
know that a state failure has been produced, and the additional information flow transfer 
conditions must be satisfied to reveal an external failure. Moreover, a failure condition that is 
infeasible within the domain of the hypothetically faulty node implies that the hypothetically 
faulty module and the hypothetically correct module are equivalent 18 . 
One possible application of the RELAY model is to hypothesize faults in a module, actually 
construct failure conditions that guarantee fault detection of the hypothesized faults, and 
select test data to satisfy these failure conditions. Although this application provides a fault-
based test data selection criterion, we are not suggesting that it is feasible or practical 19 
Rather, our model shows what is required to guarantee fault detection and demonstrates the 
complexity of the problem. The insight provided by the failure conditions, however, are useful 
for analyzing the fault detection capabilities of test data selection criteria. This analysis is 
the focus of section 6. 
As currently defined, a failure condition is derived for any hypothesized fault indepen-
dently, although many faults are similar and much of the transfer requirements are indepen-
dent of a particular hypothetical fault. The application described in the next section leverages 
this fact by grouping hypothetical faults into classes based on some common characteristic 
of the transformation and defines original state failure conditions for all hypothetical faults 
of a class. When these conditions are instantiated for a particular fault class, they provide 
conditions that guarantee introducing a state failure caused by any fault of that class. In the 
next section, we discuss the original state failure conditions for six fault classes. A simple 
example of test data satisfying a specific original state failure condition is presented at the 
18 An infoasible externa! failurc condition nwans the failure conditions must. be infC'asiblc for ali information 
fiow chains; again this is described more completcly in [Tho91]. 
19It is wdl-known that. sclection of data to sat.isfy any condition is undecidable; it. is not our intention to 
addrC'ss the N[ttivalence problcm with failurc conditions. 
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end of the next section. These conditions can be used to evaluate the ability of test data 
selection criteria to guarantee detection of faults in chosen classes. RELA Y is applied in this 
fashion to analyze three test data selection cri teria for the six fault classes in section 6. 
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5 Application of RELAY for Fault Classes 
The previous section described the RELA Y model and how it defines a failure condition for a 
hypothetical fault, which guarantees origination of a potential failure, computational transfer 
to produce an original state failure at the faulty node, and information fiow transfer to a 
failure node. Here, we describe how we can hypothesize many potential ways in which a 
node might be faulty and develop failure condition sets that apply to a class of hypothetical 
faults. This technique for applying the RELAY model takes advantage of two facts. First, 
similar hypothetical faults (such as transformation to alternative arithmetic operators) have 
similar origination conditions. Second, all hypothetical faults in a particular expression must 
basically transfer through the same computations and information fiow to a failure. Thus, 
although the origination conditions may differ, the transfer conditions are basically the same. 
This section describes REL A Y 's application for fault classes, demonstrates the instantiation of 
the original state failure conditions for one fault class, and illustrates by example what these 
mean for test data. 
Any syntactic expression in a module's source code may be faulty, but only in ways that 
retain the module's semantic correctness ( compilability). Thus, for any expression, we can 
hypothesize limited classes of faults that might occur. By grouping these hypothetical faults 
into classes based on sorne common characteristic of the transformation, we can define failure 
conditions that guarantee origination of a potential failure for any hypothetical fault of that 
class. Moreover, we can consider the ancestor operators that reference su ch an expression 
and define the computational transfer conditions that apply to a fault class and are required 
to transfer the original potential failure to produce an original state failure; and likewise for 
information fiow transfer. 
For an expression in a module, a hypothetical fault class determines a set of alternative 
expressions, which must contain the correct expression if the original expression indeed con-
tains a fault of that class. To guarantee origination of a potential failure for a class, the 
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hypothetically faulty expression must be distinguished from ea.ch expression in this alterna.te 
set. For ea.ch alterna.ti ve expression, the RELAY model defines a.u origina.tion condition, which 
guarantees origina.tion of a. potential failure if the corresponding alterna.te were indeed the 
correct expression. For a.u expression a.nd fault class, we define the origination condition 
set a.s the set of origina.tion conditions for each alterna.tive expression transformed by the 
fault cla.ss. The origina.tion condition set guarantees that a. potential failure originates in that 
expression if the expression contains a fa.ult of this class. 
For each alternative expression, a potential failure tha.t originates must also transfer 
through each operator in the node to reveal a state failure. The computational transfer 
conditions, which are determined by these subsequent manipula.tions of the data, are inde-
pendent of the particular alternate. Thus, for a fault class, a.u original state failure condition 
is defined for each alternate, which is the conjunction of the origination condition and the 
computa.tional transfer conditions. The original state failure condition set conta.ins a.n 
original sta.te failure condition for each alternate in the alterna.te set. It is a necessary and 
sufficient set of conditions to guarantee that a hypothetical fault of a particular class reveals 
an original state failure. 
Likewise, the original state fa.Hure for ea.ch a.lternate must transfer through information 
flow to reveal an external failure. And, likewise, these transfer conditions are independent 
of the alterna.te and can be conjoined to ea.ch original sta.te fa.Hure condition in the set. The 
failure condition set contains a failure condition for each a.lternate and guarantees that a 
hypothetical fa.ult of the class revea.Is a failure. 
Once again, consider the module in Figure 1 and the statement X := U * V, but now 
suppose tha.t the reference to U might be fa.ulty but we do not know what variable should 
be referenced. To guarantee origination of a potential failure for a.u incorrect reference to 
U, the va.lue of ea.ch al terna.ti ve va.ria.ble U2º must be distinguished from the value of U a.t 
node l. The possible alterna.tes depend on wha.t other variables ma.y be substituted for U 
2
ºWc use tlw bar notation to denote an alternate. 
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without violating the language syntax. If we assume that all variables referenced in this 
module are of the same type, then there are seven alternates and hence seven origination 
conditions. The origination condition set is {[u i= u] 1 U E {A, B, V, W, X, Y, Z} }. Recall that 
the computational transfer condition for node 1 is [v i= O]. For the information fiow chain 
where X is used to define W at node 7 and W is output at node 8, recall that the transfer 
condition is [(a;::: b) and (b i= O)]. Thus, the set {[(u i= u and (vi= O) and (a;::: b) and (b f:. O)] 
1 U E {A, B, V, W, X, Y, Z}} is a sufficient transfer condition set for this hypothetical fault. 
This set is sufficient but not necessary because ali information fiow chains are not considered. 
Thus, the RELAY model can be applied for a chosen fault classification. Hypothesizing 
a particular fault class, the origination and transfer conditions are insta.ntiated to provide 
conditions specific to tha.t class. The next subsection summarizes the insta.ntia.tion of RELAY 
for fault classes. The instantia.ted origina.tion a.nd transfer conditions can then be eva.lua.ted 
for selected (applicable) locations in a module to provide the specific failure condition sets 
that must be satisfied to gua.rantee the detection of a.ny fault in the chosen classification at the 
selected locations. The specific tra.nsfer conditions for a module can be used to measure the 
effectiveness of a pre-selected set of test data and/or to select test da.ta. A simple exa.mple of 
constructing a.n original sta.te failure condition set a.nd of test data sa.tisfying it is presented at 
the end of this section. The instantiated origina.tion and transfer conditions can also be used 
to eva.luate the ability of test da.ta selection criteria. to gua.ra.ntee fault detection for chosen 
fault classes. RELAY is applied in this fa.shion to analyze three test data selection criteria for 
six fault classes in section 6. This analysis demonstrates the fiaws inherent in most criteria 
and the a.dva.ntage of a complete model of faults a.nd failures. 
5 .1 Instantiation of RELA Y 
In this section, we discuss the instantiation of the RELA Y model for a fault class. The 
a.pplication presented provides original state failure conditions for statements hypothetically 
containing a fault in one of six cla.sses. The restriction to original state failures mea.ns that 
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only computational transfer need be considered at this time. Developing original state failure 
conditions for a fault class consists of developing the origination conditions for the fault class 
and also developing any applicable computational transfer conditions. This instantiation 
process is illustrated for the class of relational operator faults. We derive the origination 
conditions for this class and the computational transfer conditions through boolean operators 
since a relational expression may be contained within boolean expressions. 
RELA Y is instantiated for six fault classes in [RT86 b]. The six classes are constant refer-
ence fault, variable reference fault, variable definition fault, boolean operator fault, relational 
operator fault, arithmetic operator fault. These six classes were selected because of their rel-
evance to a number of test data selection criteria, which include those criteria analyzed here. 
Each of the six classes is a class of atomic faults, where a (hypothetical) fault f is atomic if 
the node n differs from the hypothetically correct node n' by a single token. 
To determine the original state failure conditions for a class of hypothetical faults, we 
must instantiate the applicable computational transfer conditions as well as the origination 
condition for the class. Thus, for the six fault classes, in [RT86b] we derive origination 
conditions for each class as well as transfer conditions through all operators applicable to these 
faults - that is, assignment operator, boolean operators, arithmetic operators, and relational 
operators. The origination .conditions for the six fault classes along with the computational 
transfer conditions through the four applicable operators are summarized in the appendix. 
5.1.1 Origination Conditions for Relational Operator Faults 
An origination condition guarantees that the smallest valued expression containing a hypo-
thetical fault produces a potential failure. Thus, given the smallest evaluable expression EX P 
containing a hypothetical fault andan alternative expression EX P, the origination condition 
guarantees that exp # exp. 
Consider the class of relational operator faults, where a potential failure may result when 
a relational operator is mistakenly replaced with another relational operator. We consider 
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six relational operators: <, ~, =, 1', 2, >. G iven a relational expression (E X P1 RO P E X P2), 
if the relational operator ROP is faulty, then the correct expression must be in a set of 
alternates {(EX P1 ROP EX P2) 1 ROP is a relational operator other than ROP}. 
As an example, let us construct the origination condition for the relational operator < and 
an alternative operator =. We must determine the origination condition that distinguishes 
(EX Pi < EX P2) from (EX Pi = EX P2). For any relational expression, there are three 
possible relations for which test data may be selected - ( expi < exp2), ( expi = exp2), 
(expi > exp2). The origination condition to distinguish between EX Pi < EX P2 and 
EX Pi = EX P2 is [expi ~ exp2]. The original expression, (EX Pi < EX P2), and al-
ternative expression, (EX Pi = EX P2), evaluate differently whenever either the relation 
(expi < exp2) or the relation (expi = exp2) is satisfied; thus the condition (expi ~ exp2) is 
sufficient for origination of a potential failure. When the third possible relation is satisfied, 
(exp1 > exp2), the original and alternate expressions evaluate the same; hence, the condi-
tion (exp1 ~ exp2) is also necessary for origination of a potential failure. The origination 
conditions for the other alternative operators are derived similarly; this derivation is detailed 
in [RT86b]. The origination conditions for all relational operator faults are summarized in 
Table l. The origination condition set for a given relational operator and the relational oper-
ator fault class is the set of all origination conditions that distinguish the given operator from 
some alternate. Thus, for a hypothetically faulty , operator, the origination condition set 
is {[expi = e;i:p2], [expi ~ exp2], [exp1 > exp2], [true], [exp1 1' exp2]]}. Often an origination 
condition set can be reduced to a sufficient condition set due to the overlap between condi-
tions. If this set is feasible, then it's satisfaction implies origination. On the other hand, if it 
is infeasible, the more specific origination conditions in the full set must be considered. The 
sufficient origination condition set for < is {[expi = exp2], [exp1 > exp2]}. Similar sufficient 
condition sets are developed for the other fault classes in [RT86b]. 
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opera.tors unsimplified origina.tion condition origina.tion condition 
<,~ [exp1 = exp2] [exp1 = exp2] 
<,= [(exp1 <exp2) or (exp1 = exp2)] [exp1 ~ exp2] 
<)=f. [exp1>exp2] [exp1>exp2] 
<,:'.'.'. [(exp1<exp2) or (exp1 = exp2) or (exp1>exp2)] [ true] 
<,> [(exp1 <exp2) or (exp1>exp2)] [ exp1 =f. exp2] 
<= _, [expi <exp2] [expi <exp2] 
~'=f. [(expi = exp2) or (exp1>exp2)] [(exp1 :'.'.'. exp2] 
~,;::: [(expi <exp2) or (exp1>exp2)] [exp1 =f. exp2] 
~,> [(expi <exp2) or (exp1 = exp2) or (exp1>exp2)] [true] 
=,=f. [(exp1 <exp2) or (exp1 = exp2) or (exp1>exp2)] [true] 
=> ,_ [ expi >exp2] [exp1>exp2] 
=,> [(exp1 = exp2) or (exp1>exp2)] [expi :'.'.'. exp2] 
:¡i:, :'.'.'. [(exp1 <exp2) or (exp1 = exp2)] [exp1 ~ exp2] 
:¡i:,> [(exp1 <exp2)] [exp1 <exp2] 
:'.'.'.,> [exp1 = exp2] [exp1 = exp2] 
Ta.ble 1: Origina.tion Conclitions for Rela.tional Operator Fa.ults 
5.1.2 Computational Transfer Conditions for Boolean Operators 
A computa.tiona.l tra.nsfer condition gua.rantees tha.t a. potentia.l failure in a.n opera.nd of a.n 
expression is not ma.sked out by the computa.tion of a. parent opera.tor. Thus, given a.n 
expression OP( ... , EX P, .. . ), where a. potentia.l failure exists in EX P, the tra.nsfer con-
dition gua.ra.ntees tha.t op( . .. , exp, . .. ) also produces a. potentia.l fa.Hure. More specifica.lly, 
given EX P conta.ining a. hypothetical fault a.nd EX P a.n alterna.te, the existence of a. po-
tentia.l failure in exp implies tha.t exp =f. exp, a.nd the tra.nsfer conclition guara.ntees tha.t 
op( ... , exp, .. . ) =f. op( ... , exp, .. . ). 
Let us now continue with our illustra.tion for rela.tiona.l opera.tor fa.ults. A rela.tiona.l 
expression ma.y be conta.ined within a. boolea.n expression; thus, we must a.lso develop tra.nsfer 
conditions through boolea.n opera.tors a.nd must consider both una.ry a.nd binary boolea.n 
opera.tors. 
Consider first tra.nsfer through a. una.ry boolea.n opera.tor. The unary boolea.n tra.nsfer 
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condition gua.rantees that not (EX Pi) is clistinguished from not (EX Pi), where EX P1 and 
EX P1 a.re distinguished. No additional conditions are necessary for transfer of a potential 
failure in a unary boolean expression because not (expi) :f. not (expt) if and only if exp1 :f. 
expi. 
The binary boolean transfer conditions guarantee both that (EX P1 BOP EX P2 ) is 
distinguished from (EX P1 BOP EX P2) and that (EX P2 BOP EX Pi) is distinguished 
from (EX P2 BOP EX P1), whenever EX Pi and EX Pi a.re distinguished. Since the bina.ry 
boolean operators are commutative, we need not develop separately the transfer conditions 
for a potential failure in the right operand. The binary boolean transfer conditions depend 
u pon the boolean operator. For the boolean operator and, (exp1 andexp2) :f. (expi andexp2) 
only when exp2 =true. Thus, exp2 must be true to gua.rantee that a potential failure in exp1 
transfers through the boolean operator and. For the boolean operator or, (exp1 or exp2) :f. 
(expi or exp2) only when exp2 = false. Hence, exp2 must be false to guarantee transfer of 
the potential failure in exp1 through the boolean operator or. The transfer conditions for 
boolean operators a.re summarized in Table 2. 
operator expression transf er con di tion 
not not(expt) :f. not(expt) true 
and exp1 and exp2 :f. exp1 and exp2 exp2 =true 
or exp1 or exp2 :f. exp1 or exp2 exp2 =false 
Table 2: Transfer Conditions for Boolean Operators 
5.2 Construction of Original State Failure Condition Sets 
In this section, we illustrate the construction of an original state failure condition set for 
the relational operator fault class on an example module fragment and show test data that 
satisfies this condition set. The example module fragment is shown in Figure 4. 
Hypothesize that the relational operator at statement 2 is hypothetically faulty. The 
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1 read X, Y, Z, B, C; 
2 if (X* Y< Z or B) and C then 
Figure 4: Module Fragment 
origination condition set for < relational opera.tor fault is {[x * y = z], [x * y ::; z], [x * y > 
z], [true], [x * y =f. z]}. In fact, the origination conditions [x *y = z] and [x *y > z] are 
sufficient to satisfy the conditions for all alternates, so a sufficient origination condition set 
is {[x * y = z], [x *y > z]}. A potential failure resulting from the < in node 2 must transfer 
through the boolean opera.tors or and and. The computational tra.nsfer conditions are thus 
(b =false) and (e= true). 
The origination condition set combines with the computational transfer conditions to form 
the following original state failure condition set 
{ [(x *y= z) and (b =false) and (e= true)], 
[(x * y>z) and (b =false) and (e= true)]}. 
We are now in a position to examine test data set that guarantees that an original state 
failure is introduced. To do so, data must not only satisfy the original state failure condition 
but also must execute the node. Hence data that satisfies a failure condition must be a 
member of the doma.in of the node. For simplicity, we are considering a node that is not 
conditionally executed, a.nd hence dom(2) = DM. There are many possible test data sets 
that satisfy the failure conditions developed for this exa.mple. One such set contains the 
following two datum (1, 2, 2,false, true) and (1, 3, 2,false, true). The first datum satisfies the 
first failure condition, and the second datum satisfies the second failure condition. If the < 
opera.tor should ha.ve been sorne other relational operator, then execution for these two test 
data will reveal an original state failure. If no original state failure is revealed, then the < 
opera.tor is correct. 
32 
6 Analysis of Related Test Data Selection Criteria 
RELAY provides a sound method for analyzing the fault detection capabilities of a test data 
selection criterion in terms of its ability to guarantee detection of a failure for some chosen 
fault class( es). A test data selection criterion is usually expressed as a set of rules that the 
test data must satisfy. Our analysis approach evaluates a criterion in terms of the relationship 
between its rules and the failure conditions defined by RELAY for the six fault classes. The 
failure conditions are both necessary and sufficient to guarantee fault detection, so this is an 
unbiased means of analysis. A rule or combination of rules is judged either to be insufficient 
to reveal a failure, to be sufficient to reveal a failure, or to guarantee that a failure is revealed. 
Moreover, this analysis is completely program independent. 
In this section, we use the origination and transfer conditions for the six fault classes 
(provided in the appendix) to analyze the fault detection capabilities of three fault-based test 
data selection criteria - Budd's Error-Sensitive Test Monitoring [Bud81, Bud83], Howden's 
Weak Mutation Testing [How78, How85], and Foster's Error-Sensitive Test Case Analysis 
[Fos80, Fos83, Fos84, Fos85]. Each of these criteria was selected beca.use its author claims 
that it is geared toward detection of faults of the six classes previously discussed. 
As noted, the application of RELAY discussed in this paper is limited to revealing original 
state failures. Thus, the fallure conditions discussed here are necessary for the detection 
of a fault, but not sufficient, because the original state failure introduced by satisfaction of 
these conditions may still be masked out by later computations on the path. To guarantee 
fault detection for a particular class, the failure conditions must be augmented to include 
information fiow transfer. The analysis to follow does not consider whether or not the criteria 
consider these additional conditions (although in most cases, they do not). As we shall see, 
however, this limitation of the analysis is of little consequence, since for the most part, the 
criteria do not guarantee revealing an original state failure. Our analysis shows that none of 
the criteria guarantees detection of the considered fault classes and points out two weaknesses 
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tha.t are common to a.11 three criteria.. We also discuss how the RELAY model rectifies these 
common problems. 
For ea.ch criterion, we first define it in the terminology provided in section 3. Next, we 
examine the criterion's a.bility to sa.tisfy the origina.tion conditions for ea.ch fault class a.nd 
a.lso its a.bility to sa.tisfy tra.nsfer conditions through a.pplica.ble a.ncestor opera.tors. Then, for 
ea.ch fault class, we discuss the circumsta.nces in which the criterion will gua.ra.ntee revealing 
a.u original sta.te f ailure, which requires tha.t a single test da.tum be selected to sa.tisfy both 
a specific origina.tion condition a.nd the a.pplica.ble computa.tiona.l transfer conditions for the 
node. Although a criterion ma.y include rules tha.t sa.tisfy the origina.tion conditions a.nd 
the a.pplica.ble transfer conditions, if the criterion <loes not explicitly force all such tra.nsfer 
conditions to be sa.tisfied by the sa.me da.ta tha.t sa.tisfies the origina.tion conditions for a 
fa.ult class, detection is not guara.nteed for tha.t class. In the case where only origina.tion 
is gua.ra.nteed, revea.ling a.u original sta.te fa.Hure is gua.ra.nteed only when the fa.ult is in 
the outermost expression of the sta.tement or is contained only within expressions for which 
tra.nsfer conditions are trivial ( e.g., una.ry boolea.n). Furthermore, reca.11 tha.t the test da.ta 
selected for a particular no de n must be in dom( n). If no su ch da.ta exists to sa.tisfy the 
a.pplica.tion of a particular rule in a criterion, then the rule is unsatisfiable for n. When no 
a.lterna.tive selection guidelines a.re proposed, we a.ssume tha.t no test da.ta is selected for a.n 
unsa.tisfia.ble rule. 
In the a.na.lysis of ea.ch criterion, we a.na.lyze a.ll a.pplica.ble rules for ea.ch fa.ult class but 
do not bela.bor a.na.lysis of those tha.t clearly do not a.ddress the cla.ss. When it is obvious 
tha.t a criterion guara.ntees origina.tion or tra.nsfer ( e.g., a rule of a criterion is equiva.lent to 
a.n origina.tion or tra.nsfer condition), we merely sta.te this fa.et. Sorne of the conditions a.re 
trivially met by a.ny criterion tha.t sa.tisfies sta.tement covera.ge ( e.g., origina.tion of a consta.nt 
reference fa.ult a.nd tra.nsfer through a.ssignment opera.tor). Since ea.ch of the three criteria. 
a.na.lyzed here direct their selection of test da.ta to ea.ch sta.tement in a module, we will merely 
mention the sa.tisfa.ction of such trivial conditions. For the first criterion exa.mined, counter 
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examples are provided when a rule <loes not guarantee origination or tra.nsfer. Similar counter 
examples for the subsequent criteria are are not provided but the similarity is noted. Complete 
detailed analysis is provided in [RT86b]. 
The following is not intended to be a complete a.nalysis of the fault detection capabilities 
of these criteria. Only those faults discussed in section 5 are included in the discussion. A 
complete analysis must consider a more complete fault classification. The analysis presented 
in this paper, however, provides insight into how our model of fault detection can be used to 
analyze the strengths a.nd weaknesses of testing criteria. 
6.1 Budd 's Estimate 
Budd's Error-Sensítive Test Monítoríng (Estímate) [Bud81, Bud83] is the first stage of Budd's 
Mutation Testing suite. For the most part, the testing suite is directed toward the evaluation 
of a test data set but the first stage also provides a criterion that a.ids in the selection of test 
data. A test data set satisfying Budd's Estímate executes components in the progra.m (e.g., 
variables, operators, statements, control flow structures) over a variety of inputs. The rules 
below outline test data that must be selected to pass Estímate. 
Rule 1 For each variable V, T contains test data t,i, tb, te, there exist sorne node na, nb, n,, 
such that: 
b. tb E dom(nb) and v < O; 
c. t,, E dom(n,,) and v > O. 
Rule 2 For each each assignment V := EX P at each node n, T contains a test datum ta E 
dom (n) such that: 
a. exp =/:- v. 
Rule 3 For each binary logica.l expression, EX Pi BOP EX P2 at each node n, T contains 
test data t,1 , tb E dom (n) such that: 
a. exp1 = true and exp2 = false; 
b. exp1 = false and exp2 = true. 
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Rule 4 For each edge (n,n') E E, where BP(n,n') is the branch predicate, T contains a test 
daturn t,1 such that: 
a. ta E dom(n) and bp(n, n') = true. 
Rule 5 For each relational expression, EX P1 ROP EX P2, at each node n, T contains test 
data ta, tb, te, td E dom(n) such that: 
a. exp1 - exp2 = O; 
b. exp1 - expz > O; 
c. exp1 - exp2 < O; 
d. exp1 - expz = -t or +t (where t is a "small" value). 
Rule 6 For each binary arithmetic expression EX Pi AOP EX P2 at each node n, T contains 
a test datum t,1 E dom (n) such that: 
a. exp1 > 2 and expz > 2 . 
Rule 7 For each binary arithmetic expression EX Pi AOP C (C AOP EX Pi), (where C is 
a constant), at each node n, T contains a test datum t,1 E dom(n) such that: 
a. exp1 > 2. 
First, let us consider Estimate 's ability to originate potential failures for the six fault 
classes. Clearly, rule 3 satisfies the origination conditions for boolean operator faults, and rule 
5 satisfies the origination conditions for relational operator faults. Thus, Estimate guarantees 
origination of a potential failure for boolean and relational operator faults. 
Rule 1 appears to be concerned with forcing variables to take on a variety of values, which 
is one requirement for detection of variable ref eren ce faults. Consider the following code 
segment21 : 
1 read A,B; 
2 X:= 2*A; 
21 For simplicity, wc assumc that all variables in this scct.ion's cxamplcs are dt.lwr boolcan or intcgcr. 
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The three test data (0,0), (3,3), and (-10,-10) satisfy rule 1, for variables A and B, but would 
not distinguish a reference to A from a reference to B at node 2. Estimate is not sufficient, 
therefore, to originate a potential failure for a variable reference fault. 
Estímate 's rule 2 is directed toward the detection of variable definition faults. A test 
datum that satisfies this rule fulfills the origination condition set. The origination condition 
set, however, contains another condition, (v =f. v), that must be satisfied if (exp =f. v) is 
infeasible. Estímate <loes not satisfy this other condition, and thus a potential failure caused 
by a variable definition fault may remain undetected by Estimate. Consider the following: 
1 read A, B, C; 
2 if C = A+B then 
3 C := A+B; 
The condition (a+ b =f. e), which is the evaluation of (exp =f. v), is unsatisfiable at node 
3. It is possible, in fact quite likely, however, that the definition at node 3 should be to a 
variable other than C, such as to D. To detect such a variable definition fault, the val u es of 
C and D must differ before execution of node 3, a condition not required by Estimate. Thus, 
Estimate is sufficient to origina.te a potential failure for a variable definition fault, but it <loes 
not guarantee origination for this fault class. 
Rule 6 is specifically concerned with arithmetic operator faults. Budd notes that test data 
satisfying this rule distinguishes between an arithmetic expression and an alternate formed by 
replacing the arithmetic operator by another arithmetic operator except for an addition or a 
subtraction operator replaced by a division operator ( or vice versa). We agree that Estimate 
origina.tes a potential failure for an arithmetic operator fault in all but the four exceptions just 
cited. Estimate, however, is more stringent than necessary. When this rule is unsatisfiable 
- that is, no test datum exists such that (exp1 > 2) and (exp2 > 2) - there may exist an 
undetected potential failure due to an arithmetic operator fault. For instance, consider the 
following: 
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1 read X, Y; 
2 if X ::::; 2 and Y ::::; X then 
3 A:= X*Y; 
Note that at node 3, X and Y are restricted to va.lues less than or equal to 2. In this 
case, Estimate 's rule is unsatisfiable, and no data must be selected to satisfy rule 6 for this 
statement. The expression A := X+ Y is an a.lternate that is not equivalent; there are data 
within the domain of the statement for which the two expressions eva.luate differently -
(e.g., x = 2 and y= 1). Thus, Estimate is only sufficient to origina.te a potentia.l failure for 
arithmetic opera.tor faults except for the four noted exceptions, where Estimate is insufficient. 
Estimate, however, <loes not guara.ntee origination of a potential failure for any arithmetic 
opera.tor fault. 
Let us now consider how Estimate <loes with transfer conditions. Note first that rule 3 
fulfills and guara.ntees the tra.nsfer conditions through boolea.n opera.tors. 
Estimate 's rule 5 is similar to one of the general sufficient transfer conditions shown in 
the appendix, a.lthough Estimate <loes not consider the assumptions noted there. Even if 
these assurnptions were taken into account, one of these sufficient conditions is not by itself 
su:fficient to guara.ntee transfer through a rela.tional operator. Suppose X* Y should be X+ Y 
in the following: 
1 read X, Y; 
2 if X* Y :2: 10 then 
Test datum (11,1) would origina.te a potentia.l failure (since 11 + 1 -=f. 11 * 1) and sa.tisfies 
rule 5 (since X* Y differs from 10 by a sma.ll a.mount). However, the potentia.1 failure is not 
transferred through the rela.tiona.1 operators since both 11 + 1 and 11 * 1 are ~ 10. Thus, 
Estimate is not sufficient to tra.nsfer through relational operators. 
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A test daturn satisfying Estimate's rule 6 satisfies transfer conditions through all arith-
metic operators but the exponentiation operators. Rule 6, however, is more restrictive than 
necessary; when unsatisfiable, it does not guarantee absence of a fault. Assume a potential 
failure origina.tes in x at node 3 in the following: 
1 read X, Y; 
2 if X ~ 2 and Y ~ X then 
3 A:=X*Y; 
No test datum satisfies rule 6 for this node; however, a test datum such that y f. O transfers 
any potential failure in x. Thus, Estímate is sufficient to transfer through most but not all 
arithmetic operators but <loes not guarantee transfer. 
We are now in a position to determine the ability of Estímate to guarantee revealing an 
original state failure for the six fault classes. In general, Estímate does not require data 
that satisfy origination conditions to also satisfy transfer conditions, and thus transfer of an 
originated potential failure is not guaranteed. This is beca.use Estímate <loes not prescribe 
any integration of the application of its rules. When two or more rules are applicable to an 
expression, Estímate <loes not dicta.te any way in which these two rules should interact. As 
an exarnple, consider revealing an original state fa.Hure for a relational operator fault in the 
expression (A< B) or Z in the following: 
1 read A, B, Z; 
2 if A< B or Z then 
The test data shown in Table 3 satisfies Estímate 's rules 3, 4 and 5 for this expression. Test 
data i, ii, and iii satisfy rule 5 for the relational expression containing the operator <. If 
this relational operator should ha ve been any other relational operator, this test data would 
origina te a potential failure; for these test data, however, z =true, which will not transfer 
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value of variable 
datum a b z 
i 1 3 true 
¡¡ 3 1 true 
iii 2 2 true 
iv 1 2 false 
V 2 1 true 
vi 3 1 false 
Table 3: Sample Test Data Selected by Estimate for (A< B) or Z 
any potential failure. Test data iii and iv satisfy rule 3 for the outer boolean expression 
containing or. Data v and vi satisfy rule 4 for the conditional statement. Test data iv and 
vi are the only data that would transfer any potential f ailure originated in the relational 
expression; these data alone, however, are insufficient to guarantee origination of a potential 
failure for a relational operator fault. If, for example, the < should be ::=;, no selected datum 
both originates and transfers a potential failure caused by this fault. Thus, Estimate <loes 
not guarantee revealing an original state failure for this relational operator fault. 
The prescription of rule integration is lacking even in the repeated use of a single rule, 
as illustrated in the application of rule 3 to the boolean expression (X and Y) or Z in the 
following: 
1 read X, Y, Z; 
2 if (X and Y) or Z then 
The test data shown in Table 4 satisfies Estimate 's rule 3 for the conditional expression in 
this example. Test data i and ii satisfy rule 3 for the inner boolean expression containing the 
operator and. Test data iii and iv satisfy rule 3 for the outer boolean expression containing 
or. If the inner operator should have been an or, test data i and ii would originate a potential 
failure. For these test data, however, z =true, which will not transfer any potential failure. 
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value of variable 
datum X y z 
true false true 
¡¡ false true true 
iii true true false 
iv false false true 
Table 4: Sample Test Data Selected by Estímate for (X and Y) or Z 
Test data iii and v are the only data that would transfer a potential failure originated at the 
inner expression, but for these test data, the values x and y would not origina.te a potential 
failure. Thus, Estímate <loes not guarantee revealing an original state failure for a boolean 
opera.tor fault. 
When origination of a potential failure is guaranteed for a fault class, revealing an original 
state failure is guaranteed by Estímate only when the transfer conditions are trivial. In gen-
eral, this occurs when the smallest expression containing the fault is the outermost expression 
in the node. The transfer conditions are always trivial for a variable definition fault. Since 
Estímate is sufficient to originate a potential failure for this class, it is also sufficient to reveal 
an original state failure. Recall, however, that Estímate <loes not guarantee origination for 
this class. 
6.2 Howden's Weak Mutation Testing 
Howden's Weak Mutation Testíng ( WMT) [How82, How85, How86] is a test data selection 
criterion whereby test data is selected to distinguish between a component and alternative 
components genera.ted by application of component transformations- e.g., substitution of one 
variable for another. Howden considers six transformations, which may be applied to various 
program components, a.nd includes test data selection rules geared toward the detection of 
these tra.nsformations. Although Howden's transforma.tions are presented quite differently 
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than the six fault classes, ea.ch of these transforrnations results in one of the fault classes. 
The rules below specify test data intended to clistinguish between a prograrn component and 
alternatives generated by the transformations. These rules must be met by a test data set T 
to satisfy Howden's weak mutation testing. 
Rule 1 For ea.ch reference to a variable V at node n, T contains a single test datum t,1 E 
dom (n) such that for ea.ch other variable V 
a. V :f V 22 . 
Rule 2 For ea.ch assigmnent V := EX P at node n, T contains a test datum t,. E dom (n) 
such that: 
a. v :f exp. 
Rule 3 For ea.ch boolea.n expression BOP(EX Pi, EX P2, ... , EX P¡) atea.ch node n, T con-
tains test data ti, t2, ... , t2; E dom ( n) su ch tha.t {ti, t2, ... , t2;} covers all possi ble combina-
tions of true and false values for the subexpressions EX Pi, EX P2, ... , EX Pn. 
Rule 4 For ea.ch relationa.l expression EX Pi ROP EX P2, at ea.ch node n, T contains test 
data t,., tb, t,, E dom (n) such tha.t: 
a. expi - exp2 = -E ( where -E is the negative difference of smallest satisfia.ble ma.gni-
tude) ¡ 
b. expi - exp2 = O¡ 
c. expi - exp2 =+E (where E is the positive difference of smallest satisfia.ble magnitude). 
Rule 5 For each arithmetic expression EX P at node n, T contains test data tn, tb E dom 
(n) such that: 
a. the expression is executed; 
b. exp :f O. 
Rule 6 For each arithmetic expression EX P, where k is a.u upper bound on the exponent 
in the exp, a.t node n, T contains test da.ta ti, t2, ... tk+l E dom (n) such that {ti, t2, ... tk+d 
is any casca.de set of degree k + 1 in dom ( n). 
22 Howdrn proposrs a moro rrstrictivo rulo that. is sprcifically concornod with array roforoncos. Sincr t.his rulo 
is subsumod by rulo l. it doos not provido any additional failuro dotoction capabilitios and wo do not includo 
it horo. 
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Howden's WMT guara.ntees origina.tion of a potential failure for boolea.n a.nd rela.tiona.l 
opera.tor faults. Rule 3 sa.tisfies the origina.tion condition set for boolea.n opera.tor fault, a.nd 
rule 4 sa.tisfies the origina.tion condition set for relational opera.tor fault. 
Rule 1 is obviously directed toward detection of varia.ble reference faults, a.nd a test da.tum 
that sa.tisfies this rule <loes sa.tisfy the origina.tion condition set. This rule, however, is more 
restrictive tha.n required for this fault cla.ss; it requires a single test datum to distinguish 
between the faulty variable reference and all other variable references. This rule ma.y not be 
sa.tisfiable although the origination condition set is fea.sible. In this ca.se, a non-equivalent 
alterna.te ma.y not be distinguished. Thus, WMT is sufficient to origina.te a potential failure, 
therefore, but does not gua.ra.ntee origina.tion for varia.ble reference faults. 
WMT's rule 2 is the same as Estimate 's rule 2, which is directed towa.rd detection of 
variable definition faults. As noted in the discussion of Estimate, a test da.tum sa.tisfying 
this rule will origina.te a potential failure for a varia.ble definition fault. This rule alone is 
incomplete, however, since it <loes not gua.rantee absence of a fault when it is unsa.tisfia.ble. 
Thus, WMT is sufficient but <loes not gua.ra.ntee origina.tion for this cla.ss. 
Rules 5 and 6 a.re the only rules specifica.lly directed toward exercising arithmetic expres-
sions. For a.n arithmetic opera.tor fault that excha.nges an a.ddition operator for a subtra.ction 
opera.tor ( a.nd vice versa), rule 5 will guarantee origination of a potential failure. For other 
a.rithmetic opera.tor faults, this rule is insufficient. Rule 6 is insufficient to guarantee origina.-
tion of a potential failure due to an arithmetic opera.tor fault. This is because such a fault 
ma.y change the degree of the arithmetic expression. Consider the arithmetic expression in 
node 2 of the following: 
1 read X, Y; 
2 A:= X+ Y; 
Rule 6 requires a cascade set of degree 2 for this expression. One such set is {(O, O), (2, 2)}. 
This set of test data, however, does not distinguish the expression X + Y from the alternate 
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X*Y. 
Next, consider the a.bility of WMT to tra.nsfer a. potential fa.Hure. Rule 3 selects da.ta. tha.t 
sa.tisfies the boolea.n tra.nsfer condition a.nd guara.ntees tra.nsfer through boolea.n opera.tors. 
WMT's rule 4 is similar to the sufficient transfer conditions for rela.tiona.l opera.tors. For 
these tra.nsfer conditions to be sufficient, the two assumptions noted in the ta.ble in the 
a.ppendix must a.lso hold. WMT <loes not consider these a.ssumptions. Hence, even when 
WMT's rule 4 is sa.tisfied, a. potentia.l fa.Hure ma.y not tra.nsfer through a. rela.tiona.l opera.tor. 
Thus WMT is insufficient to tra.nsfer a. potential failure through a. relational opera.tor. 
Rule 5 sa.tisfies the tra.nsfer conditions for a.11 arithmetic opera.tors but the exponentia.tion 
operator. Rule 6 <loes not a.pply beca.use a. proper casca.de set ca.nnot be selected when the 
degree of the expression is unknown. WMT, therefore, only pa.rtially guara.ntees tra.nsfer 
through a.rithmetic opera.tors. 
As with Estímate, WMT <loes not require tha.t a. rule tha.t sa.tisfies origina.tion be rela.ted to 
a. rule tha.t sa.tisfies transfer. Thus, origina.tion a.nd tra.nsfer are not guara.nteed to be sa.tisfied 
by the sa.me test da.tum, a.nd hence revealing a.n original sta.te fa.Hure is not guara.nteed. As 
with Estímate, this ma.y ha.ppen both when the sa.me rule a.pplies for origina.tion as for tra.nsfer 
a.nd when different rules a.pply. In sum, Howden's WMT guara.ntees revea.ling a.u original sta.te 
fa.Hure when origina.tion of a. potentia.l fa.Hure is gua.ra.nteed for a. fa.ult cla.ss a.nd the tra.nsfer 
conditions a.re trivial. Only for varia.ble definition fa.ult are the tra.nsfer conditions a.lwa.ys 
trivial. WMT is sufficient to origina.te a. potentia.l failure for this cla.ss a.nd hence is sufficient 
to revea.1 a.n original sta.te fa.Hure. 
6.3 Foster's Error-Sensítíve Test Case Analysís 
Foster's error-sensítive test case analysis {ESTCA) [Fos80, Fos83, Fos84, Fos85] a.da.pts ideas 
a.nd techniques from hardware fa.Hure a.nalysis such a.s "stuck-a.t-one, stuck-a.t-zero" to soft-
ware. He has presented his rules in a number of a.rticles. Where there is inconsistency, we 
will evalua.te the most recently published a.pplica.ble rules. A test data. set T satisfies Foster's 
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ESTCA if the rules outlined below a.re sa.tisfied. 
Rule 1 For ea.ch va.ria.ble V input a.t node nu, a.nd for ea.ch va.ria.ble W input a.t node nw, T 
conta.ins test da.tum, t 11 E dom(n¡inal) such tha.t: 
a. the va.lue input for V is not equa.l to the va.lue input for W. 
Rule 2 For ea.ch varia.ble V input a.t node n a.nd some edge(n, n'), T contains test da.ta. 
ta, tb E dom (n') such tha.t the va.lue input for V a.t node nis: 
a. Vn >O; 
b. Vb <O; 
where v,. a.nd Vb ha.ve different ma.gnitude (if v is restricted to only positive or :nega.tive va.lues, 
v,i a.nd Vb need only be of different ma.gnitude). 
Rule 3 For ea.ch logica.l unit L 23 of ea.ch boolea.n expression EXP =( ... L ... ) a.t node n, 
let EX P' = ( ... •L ... ), T conta.ins test da.ta. t,i, tb E dom (n) such tha.t: 
a. l = true a.nd exp' = •exp 24 ; 
b. l = false a.nd exp' = •exp. 
Rule 4 For ea.ch rela.tiona.l expression EX Pi ROP EX P2 a.t ea.ch node n, T conta.ins test 
da.ta tn, tb, t,_, E dom (n) such that: 
a. exp1 - exp2 = -t: ( where -t: is the nega.tive number of sma.llest ma.gnitude repre-
sentable for the type of exp1 - exp2); 
b. exp1 - exp2 = O; 
c. e:i;p1 - exp2 = +t: ( where t: is the positive number of smallest ma.gnitude representa.ble 
for the type of exp1 - exp2). 
Rule 5 For ea.ch a.ssignment V := EX P a.t node n and for ea.ch varia.ble W referenced in 
EX P, T conta.ins a. test da.tum tn E dom (n) such tha.t: 
a. w has a. measurable effect on the sign a.nd ma.gnitude of exp. 
Foster's ESTCA contain no rules tha.t a.pproa.ch the origina.tion conditions for either a 
variable reference fault or a variable definition fault. 
Foster's ESTCA gua.rantees origination of a boolean operator fault. Rule 3 considers a 
boolean expression in terms oflogical units. A logical unit is a variable or relational expression 
23 A logical unit is r.ithl'r a logical variable', a rdational C'XprC'ssion or tlw compknwnt. of a logical unit. 
24 that is, subst.itut.ing ...,1 in EXP compll'nwnts tlw valuC' of EXP. 
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tha.t is one of the opera.nds or is a. subexpression of one of the opera.nds of a boolea.n expression 
(EX Pi BOP EX P2). ESTCA requires selection of test da.ta. such that ea.ch such logica.l unit 
ta.kes on the value true ( a.nd the val u e false) a.nd complementing the logica.l unit complements 
the entire boolea.n expression. This rule sa.tisfies the origina.tion condition sets for boolean 
operator faults. To see this, notice tha.t for a.ny boolean expression EX Pi BOP EX P2 , three 
test da.ta. a.re selected, (expi,exp2) = (T,F), (F,T), and (T,T) if BOP is and, or (F,F) if 
BOP is or. This test da.ta. sa.tisfies origination conditions for a boolean operator fault. Thus, 
ESTCA gua.rantees origination of a potential fa.Hure for the class of boolea.n opera.tor faults. 
Consider now the class of rela.tional operator faults. When sa.tisfiable, ESTCA 's rule 4 
results in da.ta such that expi > exp2, expi = exp2, exp1 < exp2. Thus, test data. sa.tisfying 
this rule will origina.te a potentia.l failure for relationa.l opera.tor faults. This rule, however, 
is more stringent tha.n required a.nd ma.y be unsatisfia.ble while the origina.tion condition set 
is fea.sible. Thus, ESTCA is sufficient to origina.te a. potential failure for rela.tional opera.tor 
faults but <loes not guarantee origination of a potential failure for relational opera.tor faults. 
In a.n a.ttempt to detect faults in arithmetic expressions, ESTCA 's rule 5 requires selection 
of test da.ta such that varia.bles in a.rithmetic expressions ha.ve a measura.ble effect on the sign 
a.nd ma.gnitude of the result. Although the mea.ning of this rule is a.mbiguous, it clea.rly 
<loes not imply the origina.tion of a. potential failure for a.n a.rithmetic opera.tor fault. It is 
possible for va.ria.bles in a.n arithmetic expression to ha.ve a mea.sura.ble effect on the sign a.nd 
ma.gnitude of the result yet still evaluate the sa.me for alterna.te a.rithmetic opera.tors in the 
expression. ESTCA <loes not, we conclude, guarantee origination of a. potential fa.Hure for 
a.rithmetic opera.tor faults. 
Let us now consider the sa.tisfa.ction of transfer conditions. ESTCA 's rule 3 sa.tisfies 
tra.nsfer conditions through boolean opera.tors. The requirement tha.t complementing the 
logica.l unit complements the entire expression is equiva.lent to selecting test da.ta. tha.t sa.tisfies 
the tra.nsfer conditions. 
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Rule 4 is similar to the general sufficient transfer conditions through relational operators. 
Like Howden, however, Foster does not consider the assumptions that must hold for these 
conditions to be sufficient for transfer. Moreover, ra.ther than specifying t: to be the smallest 
satisfiable difference, Foster fixes t: at the smallest representable magnitude. As a result, the 
ability of ESTCA to tra.nsfer a potential failure through a relational operator is further limited. 
Thus, ESTCA is insufficient to transfer a potential failure through a relational operator. 
Rule 5 attempts to disallow the effect of a variable or subexpression to be masked out 
by other opera.tions in the statement. While the specifics of how this rule is applied are 
unclear, one might interpret this as requiring transfer of a potential failure through arithmetic 
opera.tors. U nder the broadest interpretation, therefore, ESTCA guara.ntees transfer through 
arithmetic operators. 
As with the other criteria, Foster fails to prescribe integration between ESTCA rules that 
satisfy origination and those that satisfy transfer. Rule 3, however, does guarantee revealing 
an original state failure for boolean operator faults. As seen above, this rule satisfies the 
origination and tra.nsfer conditions for relational operator faults. In addition, when applied 
to the outermost boolean expression, this rule selects a single datum for each nested binary 
boolean expression that originates a potential failure due to a fault in the associated boolean 
operator and tra.nsfers that potential failure to the outermost expression. To see this, consider 
any expression EX P = EX Pi BOP EX P2. Sorne test datum selected for logical units within 
E X Pi fulfills the origination condition for boolean operator faults in E X Pi. Complementing 
a test datum selected for a logical unit that is a subexpression of EX Pi must complement 
the value exp. To force this, if bop = and then exp2 =true, or if bop = or then exp2 =false. 
Thus, for any test datum selected for a logical unit that is a subexpression of EXP1, EXP2 
will take on a value that will transfer any potential failure originated within EX Pi to the 
outer expression EX P. Therefore, ESTCA 's boolean operator rule satisfies origination as 
well as transfer conditions simultaneously and hence guarantees revealing an original state 
failure for boolean operator faults. 
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6.4 Summary of Analysis 
Table 5 summarizes the analysis of the three test data selection criteria. The entry insufficient 
means that the criterion does not include a rule that satisfies the condition. The entry 
sufficient means that the criterion includes a rule that when satisfiable fulfills the condition. 
The entry partially sufficient means that the criterion includes a rule that is sufficient to 
distinguish many but not all of the alternates or transfer through many but not all of the 
operators. The entry guarantees mea.ns that the criterion includes a rule that satisfies the 
conditions when the conditions are feasible, while partially guarantees mea.ns the criterion 
includes a rule that sa.tisfies many but not all of the conditions when feasible. 
Budd's Estimate Howden's WMT Foster's ESTCA 
Origination 
l. Constant Reference Fault guarantees guarantees guarantees 
2. Variable Reference Fault insufficient sufficient insufficient 
3. Variable Definition Fault sufficient sufficient insufficient 
4. Boolean Operator Fault guarantees guarantees guarantees 
5. Relational Operator Fault guara.ntees guarantees sufficient 
6. Arithmetic Operator Fault partially partia.lly insufficient 
sufficient guarantees 
Transfer 
l. Assig:nment Operator gua.rantees guarantees guarantees 
2. Boolean Operator guarantees guarantees guarantees 
3. Relational Operator insufficient insufficient insufficient 
4. Arithmetic Operator partially partia.lly guarantees 
sufficient guarantees 
Revelation 
l. Constant Reference Fault insufficient insufficient insufficient 
2. Variable Reference Fault insufficient insufficient insufficient 
3. Variable Definition Fault sufficient sufficient insufficient 
4. Boolean Operator Fault insufficient insufficient guara.ntees 
5. Relationa.l Operator Fault insufficient insufficient insufficient 
6. Arithmetic Operator Fault insufficient insufficient insufficient 
Table 5: Analysis Summary 
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7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have described the RELAY model, which rigorously defines how a fault in 
a module causes a failure. The model includes origination, computational transfer, and data 
and control dependence transfer. This paper focuses 011 using the RELAYmodel to evaluate 
the fault detection capabilities of testing criteria. This analysis demonstrates how the rules 
of a test data selection criterion must be carefully designed and tightly integrated to reveal a 
failure for any fault. Without this precise modeling, it is easy to arrive at test data selection 
rules that do not guarantee the detection of a fault and may not even be sufficient to do so. 
U sing RELA Y, we ha ve evaluated where previous criteria ha ve failed in this regard. 
This paper demonstrates four points that distinguish RELAY from other work: 
1. RELA Y distinguishes between origination of a potential failure in the smallest expression 
that contains a hypothetical fault and the computational transfer of that potential 
failure to parent expressions; 
2. RELAY provides a detailed model of the transfer of a state failure from the faulty node 
through information flow until it is externally revealed and further considers both data 
and control dependence tra.nsfer; 
3. RELAY provides a mechanism for developing conditions tha.t must be sa.tisfied to guar-
antee fault detection; 
4. RELAY provides a specific framework in which ali these components fit. 
Let us a.ddress the significa.nce of ea.ch of these points in turn. 
First, RELAY determines origination conditions for the smallest expression conta.ining a 
fault. It then considers a.dditional computational transfer conditions necessary to revea.l a 
potentia.l failure in pa.rent expressions. Some researchers, such as Foster [Fos80], ha.ve pre-
sented criteria that are ca.pable of origina.ting a potentia.l failure in the sma.llest expression, 
but have not considered the additiona.l conditions necessa.ry to ca.use a la.rger expression to 
eva.lua.te incorrectly. Other researchers, such as Budd [Bud81], have recognized the need for a 
la.rger expression conta.ining a fault to evaluate incorrectly. They, however, ha.ve not deta.iled 
specifica.lly the conditions necessa.ry to ca.use such tra.nsfer, nor ha.ve they defined the rela.-
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tionship of origination to transfer. RELAY specifically defines such a relationship and details 
general transfer rules. Other researchers, such as Howden [How86], have examined conditions 
required to reveal faults in larger expression. The problem here is that the rules developed 
are specific for certain classes of expressions, e.g., constant reference fault in polynomial ex-
pressions. As a result, although a constant reference fault can occur in a variety of types of 
expressions, the rule is not generally applicable. Further, RELAY's separation of origination 
and transfer conditions provides a framework for fault detection that is easily extended. When 
a new fault class is considered, RELA Y requires that the origination condition set for the class 
be developed. Applicable transfer conditions from other classes are applied independently, 
however, and thus require no changes. Criteria that consider larger expressions rnust develop 
the "failure" condition for that entire expression class. We feel that proving properties about 
origination conditions of a new fault class is less complicated than proving properties about 
the revealing conditions for expression classes. 
A second major contribution of RELAY is its consideration of information flow transfer. 
While some criteria that consider hypothetical fault classes in larger expressions may select 
test data that is capable of producing a state failure, they do not (for the most part) consider 
what is required for a state failure to transfer to output. Hence, these criteria do not guarantee 
revealing a failure. Criteria that are directed toward the detection of faults in larger expres-
sions effectively achieve information flow transfer by applying their rules to [partial] path 
expressions developed through symbolic evaluation. This approach, however, is only applica-
ble to faults on paths that produce particular expression classes; this limitation is discussed 
above. The concept of "sufficiency" in Offutt's constraint-based testing [DGK+ss, D091] is 
similar to transfer, but Offutt <loes not provide any details on the nature of these conditions. 
The concept of "propagation" in Morell's symbolic fault-based testing [Mor88, Mor90] is sim-
ilar to data dependence transfer, but <loes not consider control dependence transfer. The 
distinct contributions of RELAY's information flow transfer model are considered further in 
[Tho91, TRC92], where information flow transfer is fully defined. 
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Another distinction is tha.t RELAY provides a. mea.ns of developing conditions tha.t are 
both necessa.ry a.nd sufficient to revea.l a fa.Hure. As shown by the a.na.lysis, most fa.ult-ba.sed 
testing criteria. select test da.ta tha.t a.re sufficient to origina.te a potentia.l fa.Hure for some 
fa.ult classes. When these criteria. a.re not sa.tisfia.ble, however, a.n undetected fa.ult in the 
cla.ss ma.y rema.in. Hence, these criteria do not gua.ra.ntee detection of these fa.ults. Beca.use 
RELA Y considers both the necessa.ry a.nd sufficient conditions, it does gua.ra.ntee detection. 
When a revea.ling condition for a. fa.ult class is not sa.tisfia.ble, in the RELAY model, we know 
tha.t a hypothetica.l fa.ult in the cla.ss is not a. fa.ult but ra.ther is a.n "equivalent discrepa.ncy". 
Other models of fa.ult-ba.sed testing (such as Morell's [Mor90]) do not direct how to construct 
specific conditions or to select da.ta to guara.ntee fa.ult detection. 
The final significa.nt contribution of RELA Y is tha.t it provides a general yet a.pplica.ble 
fra.mework tha.t describes how a. hypothetica.l fa.ult origina.tes a. potentia.l fa.Hure a.nd then 
how it can transfer through a module. We believe tha.t RELAY provides a. cleaner, clea.rer 
view of fa.ult-based testing tha.n other approa.ches to da.te a.nd tha.t it is a. sufficiently more 
powerful a.pproa.ch. This is clea.rly demonstra.ted in our a.nalysis, which indica.tes tha.t none 
of the exa.mined criteria. is capa.ble of gua.ra.nteeing detection of an original sta.te fa.ilure for 
the selected fa.ult classes. The precision of the RELAY model is wha.t ena.bled this a.na.lysis. 
We plan to do similar a.nalysis of criteria's a.bility to tra.nsfer a potential fa.ilure through the 
model of informa.tion fiow tra.nsfer; such a prelimina.ry ana.lysis a.ppea.rs in [TRC92]. Neither 
ana.lysis could be a.ccomplished without the formal model of fa.ults a.nd fa.ilures. 
We continue to evalua.te the RELAY model's ca.pa.bilities by insta.ntia.ting it for other fa.ult 
classes. Thus far, we ha.ve only considered simple fa.ults in a single node. It is not clear tha.t 
these a.re the most common fa.ult types. We believe, however, that our general fra.mework is 
applica.ble to la.rger, more complex fa.ults a.nd are working on extending the a.pplication to 
more complex fa.ult cla.sses. We are a.lso working on a.pplying the model to specifica.tions in 
a.u a.ttempt to detect fa.ults introduced ea.rly in the software lifecycle [ROT89]. 
In addition, we a.re a.pplying this ana.lysis method to other testing criteria.. One direction 
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of future research is to analyze the fault detection capabilities of fallure-based (rather than 
fault-based) testing criteria, such as Cohen 's and White's doma.in testing [WC80, CHR82], 
and path selection criteria, such as the variety of data flow path selection criteria [RW85, 
Nta.84, LK83, CPRZ86]. We expect that this will provide us with further insight into the 
relationship of faults and failures in programs and address the strengths and weaknesses of 
these two very different approaches to testing. As mentioned, we are also investigating the 
power of the model of information flow transfer in analyzing test criteria. 
Finally, the RELAY model enables us to analyze the implications of many assumptions 
made by testing researchers (such as the competent programmer hypothesis, the coupling 
effect, and disallowed coincidental correctness, which is assumed by sorne path-based criteria); 
sorne of these assumptions are analyzed in in [TRC92]. Such analysis may allow us to elimina.te 
or tone clown some of these assumptions. The analytical perspective provided by RELAY 
also suggests empirical studies that must be done to balance analytical evaluation and thus 
consider the impact of these assumptions. 
52 
Appendix 
A.1 Origination Conditions 25 
constant referenced origination condition set 
e true 
Table A-1: Origination Condition Set for Constant Reference Fault 
variable referenced origination condition set 
V { [v # v 1 V is a variable other than V 
that is type-compatible with V]} 
Table A-2: Origination Condition Set for Variable Reference Fault 
assignment origination condition set 
V:= EXP {[(v # v) or (exp # v) 1 V is a variable other than V 
that is type-compatible with V]}. 
Table A-3: Origination Condition Set for Variable Definition Fault 
operator origination condition set 
not { [true] } 
null { [true] } 
and {[exp1 # exp2]} 
or {[exp1 # exp2]} 
Table A-4: Origination Condition Sets for Boolean Operator Faults 
25 0rigination conditions for the a.JternatC's for a particular potential fault class are grouped and roported 
herC' as origination condition sets. 
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operator origination condition set sufficient condition set 
< {[exp1 = exp2], [exp1 > exp2], {[exp1 = exp2], [expi > exp2]} 
[exp1 ::; exp2], [exp¡ # exp2]} 
< {[expi = exp2], [exp1 < exp2], {[exp1 < exp2], [exp1 = exp2]} 
[exp1 2: exp2], [exp1 # exp2]} 
# {[exp1 > exp2], [expi ;::: exp2], {[exp1 < exp2], [expi > exp2]} 
[expi ::; exp2], [exp1 < exp2]} 
= {[exp1 ::; exp2], [exp1 < exp2], {[exp1 < exp2], [exp1 > exp2]} 
[exp1 > exp2], [exp1 2: exp2]} 
> {[exp1 =I= exp2], [exp1 > exp2], {[exp1 = exp2], [exp1 > exp2]} 
[expi ::; exp2], [exp1 = exp2]} 
> {[ex pi =I= exp2], [ exp1 ;::: exp2], {[exp1 < exp2], [expi = exp2]} 
[expi < exp2], [exp1 = exp2]} 
Table A-5: Origination Condition Sets for Relational Operator Faults 
operator origination condition set 
+ {[(exp1 + exp2) =I= (exp1 op exp2)] 
1 op=, *,/,div,**} 
- {[(expi - exp2) =I= (exp1 op exp2)] 
1 op = +,*,/, div,**} 
* 
{[(expi * exp2) =I= (exp1 op exp2)] 
1 op= +,-,/,div,**} 
/ { [ ( expi/ exp2) =I= ( exp1 op exp2)] 
1 op=+,-,*,div,**} 
div {[(exp1 div exp2) =I= (exp1 op exp2)[ 
1 op= +,-,*,/,**} 
** 
{[(exp1**exp2) =I= (exp1 op exp2)] 
1 op = +, - , *, /, di V} 
Table A-6: Origination Condition Sets for Arithmetic Operator Fault 
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A.2 Transfer Conditions 
operator expression transfer condition 
V:= EXP =/=V:= EXP true 
Table A-7: Transfer Condition Through Assignment Operator 
operator expression transfer condition 
not not(expi) =!= not(expD true 
and exp1 and exp2 =!= exp1 and exp2 exp2 =true 
or exp1 or exp2 =!= exp1 or exp2 exp2 =false 
Table A-8: Transfer Condition Through Boolean Operators 
operator expression transfer conditions 
+ ea:p1 + exp2 =!= exp1 + exp2 true 
- exp1 - exp2 =!= exp1 - exp2 true 
- e;rp2 - exp1 =!= exp2 - exp1 true 
* 
exp1 * exp2 =!= exp1 * exp2 exp2 =!=O 
/ exp1 / exp2 =!= exptf exp2 exp2 =!=O 
/ exp2/ exp1 =!= exp2/ exp1 exp2 =!=O 
** 
exp1**exp2 =!= exp1**exp2 (exp2 =!=O) and (e;rp1 =!= -exp1 or e;rp2 mod2 =!=O) 
** 
exp2**exp1 =!= exp2**exp1 (exp2 =!=O) and (exp2 =!= 1) 
and ( exp2 =!= -1 or ex pi mod 2 =!= exp1 mod 2) 
Table A-9: Transfer Conditions Through Arithmetic Operators 
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operator expression transfer conditions 
< exp1 <exp2 # exp1 <exp2) (exp1 <exp2 and exp12exp2) or 
(exp12exp2 and exp1 <exp2) 
< expi ~exp2 # exp1 S,exp2) (exp1~exp2 and exp1>exp2) or 
-
(exp1>exp2 and exp1S,exp2) 
= exp1 =exp2 # exp1 =exp2) (exp1 = exp2 and exp¡ # exp2) or 
(exp1 # exp2 and exp1 = exp2) 
# exp1 #exp2 # exp1 -=f.exp2) (exp1 # exp2 and exp¡ = exp2) or 
(exp1 = exp2 and expi # exp2) 
> exp1 >exp2 # expi >exp2) (exp1>exp2 and exp1~exp2) or 
(exp1~exp2 and exp1>exp2) 
> exp12exp2 # exp12exp2) (exp12exp2 and exp¡ <exp2) or 
-
(exp1 <exp2 and exp12exp2) 
Table A-10: Transfer Conditions Through Relational Operators 
operators sufficient transfer conditions 
<,~,=,#,>,2 exp2 - exp¡ = t:, 
exp2 - exp1 = -t:, 
exp2 - exp1 = O 
Table A-11: General Suffi.cient26 Transfer Conditions Through Relational 
Operators 
26 For sufficient transfor condit.ions through rclational operators, € is tlw smallest magnitude positive diffor-
rnce between cxp2 and cxp1 and -€is the smallest magnitude negative difference; note that. +€ and -€ may be 
of differrnt magnitude. In addition, these conditions are only sufficient under the assumption that the rclation 
between c:rp1 and c:rp1 is the same for each of the three test dat.a sclected to satisfy ali three €-conditions 
listed in the table. In addition, these conditions are not sufficient unlrss € is the smallest positive difforencc 
brtwcen cxp1 and c:rp2 and is no greater than the smallest positive difference between cxp¡ and cxp2. If 
any of t.hese €- conditions is infoasible, absence of a fault is not guaranteed by satisfaction of the remaining 
€-conditions. 
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